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DISPARATE IMPACT LAWSUITS UNDER 
TITLE VI, SECTION 602: CAN A LEGAL 
TOOL BUILD ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? 
JULIA B. LATHAM WORSHAM* 
Over the past decade, environmental Justice commentators and advocates 
increasingly have focused on the role that Title V7 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 could play in remedying environmental problems in communities of 
color. Specifically, this attention recently has targeted the application of civil 
rights law to the processes employed by government actors in issuing indus-
trial use facility siting permits and the disparate impacts that these practices 
have on minorities. Ironically, there is no controlling authority regarding 
whether such suits legitimately may be brought, or what their requirements 
and parameters might be. This article explores the development of such suits 
and probes their potential contours, ultimately suggesting how courts might 
address such issues as standing, burdens of proof, the elements of the prima 
facie case, and remedies. 
INTRODUCTION 
We Jeel that they are here because we're black. And we are being viewed as 
powerless, even though we may not be. We're being viewed as being vulner-
able. We're being viewed as being politically insignificant. And that's why 
we believe they are here. We believe that it is environmental racism.l 
-Zulene Mayfield, Chairperson of Chester Residents Concerned 
for Quality of Living 
For almost twenty years, environmental justice advocates have 
been exposing and opposing the fact that communities of color bear 
* Law Clerk to The Honorable Herbert Y.C. Choy, Senior United States Circuit Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2000-01;J.D., William S. Richardson 
School of Law, 2000; B.A., Macalester College, 1991. Many thanks to Professor Denise An-
tolini, Jerome Balter of the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Jean Campbell, 
Professor Sheila Foster, Seth Galanter at the United States Department of Justice, and Pro-
fessor Casey Jarman for their interest and assistance. All errors or omissions are my re-
sponsibility. 
1 M(fI-ning Edition (National Public Radio radio broadcast, Sept. 2, 1998) (interview by 
John Nielson with Zulene Mayfield, Chairperson of Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality Living (CRCQL)) (speaking about the presence of numerous waste management 
plants in her hometown of Chester), available in 1998 WL 3308573. 
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a disproportionately high burden of environmental hazards.2 Com-
munity groups and environmental and civil rights attorneys involved 
in the environmental justice movement have used a number of legal 
tools in their fight for recognition and eradication of the problem, 
including a variety of environmental laws,3 civil rights laws,4 common 
law property claims,5 and constitutional challenges.6 In the early to 
mid-1990s, environmental justice advocates began to pay heightened 
attention to the role that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could 
play in remedying perceived environmental problems.7 Over the past 
two years, this effort has focused on the application of civil rights law 
to the processes employed by states and local municipalities in issuing 
industrial use facility siting permits and the potentially disparate im-
pacts these processes impose on minorities. 
This article seeks to explore the ongoing debate over private 
claims brought under Title VI against local agencies for issuing per-
mits to industrial facilities that disproportionately impact minority 
populations. As awareness of racial disparity in the distribution of lo-
cally undesirable land uses (LULUs) grows, and other legal and regu-
latory actions fail to secure equity, disparate impact litigation under 
Title VI has become a lightning rod. Environmental advocates both 
praise and critique it, the United States Department of Justice sup-
ports it, and business and local governmental concerns roundly con-
demn it. But, ironically, there is no controlling authority regarding 
whether disparate impact lawsuits may even be legitimately brought 
under Title VI, and, if so, what their requirements and parameters 
might be. Today, the central open question is this: will Title VI be an 
effective tool to address environmental racism adequately? Section I 
of this article briefly summarizes the background of the environ-
2 See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285,286 (1995). 
3 See id. at 301-09; Luke Cole, Environmentaljustice Litigation: Another Stone in David's 
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 523, 525-30 (1994). 
4 See Cole, supra note 3, at 530-38; Fisher, supra note 2, at 311-15. 
5 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 309-10. 
6 See id. at 303-06; Cole, supra note 3, at 538-41. 
7 See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing ''Environmental justice": The Distributional Effects of En-
vironmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 834-39 (1993); see generally Cole, supra note 3 
(placing Title VI type claims third on a four-tier hierarchy of litigation strategies for envi-
ronmental justice attorneys); Fisher, supra note 2 (arguing that Title VI is an effective tool 
for achieving environmental justice); Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a 
Magic Bullet? Environmental Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 
2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (1996) (stating that Title VI litigation is limited by the political 
nature of environmental racism). 
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mental justice movement and the legal tactics that the movement has 
used in its attempt to end disparate siting of LULUs. Section II dis-
cusses Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, explaining both its 
regulatory nature and its potential as a private right of action. Section 
III explores the contours of private litigation under Title VI and asks 
whether it can be an effective tool for environmental justice plaintiffs. 
This article concludes by: (1) acknowledging that, as a civil rights is-
sue, discriminatory siting of objectionable facilities is in its infancy; 
and (2) posing a series of questions, the answers to which will greatly 
determine the vitality of Title VI as a tool for environmental justice. 
I. FOUNDATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Adminis-
trator Carol Browner reflected in 1998 that "[t]hirty-four years ago, 
when the Civil Rights Act was adopted, no one fully appreciated that 
pollution could also be a means for effecting [sic] some communities 
more than others."8 Today, the concept that minorities bear a dispro-
portionate percentage of environmental burdens is at the core of the 
environmental justice movement. 
A. Pursuing Environmentaljustice: Origins and Definitions 
The modern environmental justice movement traces its roots 
variously back to either a Texas environmental rights suit filed in 
1979,9 or a North Carolina citizens' protest in 1982.10 In the Texas 
case, attorney Linda McKeever Bullard, on behalf of the residents of 
Houston's Northwood Manor, brought the nation's first lawsuit that 
challenged the siting of a waste facility based on violations of the civil 
rights laws.n In moving for a preliminary injunction, Ms. Bullard ar-
gued that locating a garbage dump in the plaintiffs' mostly African-
American community was an act of racial discrimination in violation 
of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,12 Although the court 
found that the siting decision "seem[ed] to have been insensitive and 
8 United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Carol M. Browner, 
Remarks at the Environmental Justice Roundtable (July 17,1998) (transcript available at 
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/html .. doc/ejremark.htm> ). 
9 See Cole, supra note 3, at 523. 
10 See Meredith]. Bowers, The Executive's Response to Environnwntal Injustice: Executive Or .. 
der 12,898,1 ENVTL. L. 645,645-46 (1995). 
11 See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (S.D. 
Tex. 1979), afJ'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); Cole, supra note 3, at 523. 
12 See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 674-75; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
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illogical" and would itself have denied the challenged permit had it 
been the permitting authority, the court conceded that its role was 
solely to determine whether the plaintiffs had "established a substan-
tial likelihood of proving that [the Texas Department of Health's] 
decision to issue the permit was motivated by purposeful discrimina-
tion .... "13 Unable to find a substantial likelihood of purposeful dis-
crimination, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary 
injunction, but also denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit 
on grounds of abstention, laches, and absence of state action.14 While 
the plaintiffs did not pursue their equal protection claim after the 
court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the 
lawsuit served as a catalyst for the legal arm of the environmental jus-
tice movement. 
The North Carolina event in 1982 is noted not only for its legal 
action,15 but also for the predominately Mrican-American commu-
nity's protest, modeled after the civil rights protests of the 1960s, 
against a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill.l6 This protest 
brought national attention to the citizens' cause in Warren County, 
North Carolina, and resulted in a United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) investigation of the demographics of southeastern 
communities that contained significant landfills. 17 
The 1983 GAO study, Siting Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their 
Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, 
was among the first studies to focus on the distribution of environ-
mental risks. IS The GAO study confirmed a central allegation of the 
environmental justice movement-the proposition that racial minori-
ties are burdened by a disproportionate amount of these riskS.19 Four 
13 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 681. 
\4 See id. at 675, 680-81. 
15 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 296. The NAACP brought a federal Equal Protection suit 
in an effort to stop the citing of a polychlorinate biphenyl (PCB) disposal facility in War-
ren County, North Carolina. See id. "PCBs are members of the family of halogenated aro-
matic hydrocarbons. This family also contains DDT and TCDD (Dioxin), some of the most 
toxic substances known to life .... " Bowers, supra note 10, at 646 n.5 (quoting Ken Geiser 
and Gerry Waneck, PCBs and Warren County, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, 43, 44 (Robert Bullard ed., 1994». 
16 See Bowers, supra note 1 0, at 646. 
17 See id. The GAO report was directly requested by Walter Fauntroy, the District of Co-
lumbia's delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, who was arrested as a participant 
at the Warren County protests. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 296. 
18 See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 801. 
19 See id. The GAO study focused on locations of "offsite" hazardous waste landfills 
(those that are not part of an industrial facility) in the southeastern United States. See id. 
The final study reported that, "[b ] lacks make up the majority of the population in three of 
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years later, the United Church of Christ (UC) Commission for Racial 
Justice conducted a broader study that examined hazardous waste 
sites across the country and controlled for factors such as urbaniza-
tion and regional differences.2o The UC study reported that 
"[a]lthough socio-economic status appeared to play an important role 
in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still 
proved to be more significant."21 In fact, "race was consistently a more 
prominent factor in the location of commercial hazardous waste fa-
cilities than any other factor examined. "22 
The GAO and UC findings received significant publicity and 
generated a great deal of both support and criticism.23 In response to 
growing pressure from academics and government officials, President 
Bush's EPA Administrator William K. Reilly eventually established the 
"Environmental Equity" working group in 1990 to study environ-
mental justice issues.24 EPA's 1992 Environmental Equity Report 
confirmed the earlier studies, finding that members of minority popu-
lations have "disproportionately greater 'observed and potential ex-
posure' to environmental pollutants,"25 and this dis proportionality 
could not be explained by income alone. "[A] comparison between 
poor, Mrican American, and Hispanic percentages shows that these 
minority groups are more concentrated in [substandard air quality 
regions] than the poor population in general. "26 
Studies such as those conducted by the GAO, UC, and EPA, and 
the controversy they engendered, led Dr. Benjamin Chavis, head of 
the four communities where the landfills are located." Id. (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL 
AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO 
STUDY]). Additionally, "[a]t least 26 percent of the population in all four communities 
have income below the poverty level and most of this population is Black." [d. (quoting 
GAO STUDY, supra). 
20 See id. at 801-02 (citing UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUS-
TICE, TOXIC WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter UC STUDY]). Dr. 
Benjamin Chavis, head of the United Church of Christ's Commission on RacialJustice, was 
also arrested in the Wan'en County protests. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 297. 
21 Lazarus, supra note 7, at 801-02 (quoting UC STUDY, supra note 20). 
22 Fisher, supra note 2, at 297 (quoting UC STUDY, supra note 20). 
23 See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 802-03. 
24 see id. at 803-04. 
25 [d. at 805 (quoting 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, 
PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL 
COMMUNITIES, WORKGROUP REpORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR (June 1992) [hereinafter 
EPA EQUITY REpORT l). 
26 Id. (quoting D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Dispro-
portionatelyExposed, 18 EPAj. 16, 17 (1992)). 
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the UC's Commission of Racial Justice, to coin the phrase "environ-
mental racism "27 in 1993 to describe this disproportionate environ-
mental impact on racial minorities. Dr. Chavis defined the term: 
Environmental Racism is . . . racial discrimination in envi-
ronmental policy making and the unequal enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations. It is the deliberate tar-
geting of people of color communities for toxic waste facili-
ties and the official sanctioning of life-threatening presence 
of poisons and pollutants in people of color communities.28 
Professor Robert Bullard, Director of the Environmental Justice Re-
source Center at Clark Atlanta University and a prolific commentator 
on environmental justice issues, proffered a less intent-focused 
definition of environmental racism and emphasized the unequal re-
sults of the practice:29 
[A]ny policy, practice, or directive that, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, differentially impacts or disadvantages individuals, 
groups, or communities based on race or color; [as well as 
the] exclusionary and restrictive practices that limit partici-
pation by people of color in decision-making boards, com-
missions, and staffs.30 
Although the environmental justice movement has been building 
momentum over the last decade, it is not without challengers.31 Those 
who question the assumptions of the movement cite studies that have 
27 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 289. 
28 Id. (quoting Environmental Racism: Hearings Before the Hoose Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 1993) (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F. 
Chavis, Jr.) ) . 
29 See id. at 290. Dr. Robert Bullard is married to Linda McKeever Bullard, the attorney 
who represented the Northwood Manor community in Bean v. Soothwestern Waste Mana~ 
ment, 482 F. Supp.673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). See supra text accompanying notes 9-14; Cole, 
supra note 3, at 539. 
30 Fisher, supra note 2, at 289-90 (quoting Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity: Ex-
amining the Evidence of Environmental Racism, LAND USE F., Winter 1993, at 6) (citations 
omitted». 
31 See generally Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispro-
portionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE LJ. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Market 
Dynamics]; Vicki Been, What~ Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter Been, Fairness]; 
Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism» and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A Critique of Envi-
ronmentalJustice Theories and RerrU!dies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 121 (1997) (examining some of 
the assumptions supporting the environmental justice movement by considering the alle-
gation of impact on minority communities). 
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found that race is not an independent predictor of adverse environ-
mental impacts,32 and both critics and advocates alike have ques-
tioned the methodology of some studies frequently cited by environ-
mental justice advocates.33 Critics have also challenged the underlying 
assumption that disparity is necessarily indicative of racial prejudice, 
and stress that factors other than racism can account for distributional 
imbalances in the siting of facilities. 34 Any legal approach that seeks to 
remedy environmental racism will need to confront these arguments. 
32 See Kevin, supra note 31, at 133-34 (citing Douglas A. Anderton, et aI., Hazardous 
Waste Facilities: "Environmental Equity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REv. 123, 
129 (1994)). The Anderton study looked at hazardous wasle treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities in the United States that opened before 1990 and were still operating in 
1992. See id. The study indicated that there were no statistically significant differences in 
percentages of Mrican Americans and Latinos in census tracts with such LULUs and in 
those without. See id. at 134. While the Anderton study found a correlation between socio-
economic factors (such as lower employment rate for men, industrial employment, and 
lower property values) and siting, it concluded that there was no correlation between the 
presence of minorities and the presence of these facilities. See id.; see also M~or Willie A. 
Gunn, From the Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alle-
viate Environmental Injustice, OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1227, 1239-40 (1996) (citing Tracy Yandle, 
Study Presented at the Air and Waste Management Association Annual Meeting (Summer 
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Major Gunn)). The Yandle study found that 
poorer communities in metropolitan areas of Texas were more likely to contain hazardous 
landfills than were more affluent areas. See id. However, it also found that landfills were 
statistically more likely to be in m~ority communities, rather than in minority communi-
ties. See id. This result may have been significantly impacted by the fact tllat tlle Yandle 
study classified "Hispanics" as members of the majority community, and that Texas has a 
Latino population of approximately twenty-five percent. See id. 
33 See Kevin, supra note 31, at 134-37. Mr. Kevin, an environmental analyst at the 
Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory, makes his own challenges to the 
UC and GAO studies, among others, but also cites criticism of the UC study made by some 
environmental justice advocates. See id. at 135 n.72 (citing Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and 
Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Haste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to 
a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1047, 1130 (1994); Lazams, supra note 7, at 857 n.56)). 
Mr. Kevin's key criticisms of the UC study include the use of zip codes in defining the geo-
graphically affected area, the use of current demographics rather than demographics 
reflecting the population at the time facilities were sited, and UC's equation of proximity 
to a toxic facility with exposure to toxic releases. See id. at 135-36. 
34 See Kevin, supra note 31, at 137-45. Mr. Kevin states that considerations such as 
physical geography (geological stability, soil pe,'meability, and absence of groundwater), 
expense in relation to other areas, proximity to similar facilities, proximity to transporta-
tion routes, and level of local opposition drive siting decisions. See id. at 138. He argues 
that "absent more concrete evidence of racial animus, disparate impacts or unequal results 
should be considered disproportionate only when other, non-racial factors do not explain 
siting." Id. at 138-39. 
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B. The Range of Legal Strategies Attempted in Permit Siting Cases 
Environmental justice critics, activists, and scholars alike have 
offered a variety of theories to explain why the nation's minorities are 
disproportionately burdened with environmental pollutants and 
wastes.35 The primary focus of the environmental justice movement 
has been on the disparate burdening of minority communities by the 
initial siting of industrial facilities. 36 To address perceived discrimina-
tive effects in siting, minority community groups and environmental 
justice organizations have employed a wide variety of legal ,strategies 
including federal and state environmental laws,37 common law tort 
claims,38 constitutional challenges,39 and civil rights laws.40 This sec-
tion briefly explores those strategies, highlighting their strengths and 
limitations, and explains why some advocates have focused on Title VI 
as a powerful tool for environmental justice. 
1. Causes of Action Under Environmental Statutes 
Luke Cole, Staff Attorney for the California Rural Legal Assis-
tance Foundation and General Counsel for the Center on Race, Pov-
35 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 2, at 291-96 (citing as hypotheses lack of political power 
in minority communities, market forces, and the tendency of minorities to seek jobs-and 
therefore homes-in communities with high levels of industrial use); Sheila Foster, Justice 
From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transfonnative Politics 
of the EnvironrnentalJustice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 775, 787-811 (1998) [hereinafter Fos-
ter, Justice] (explaining that market dynamics, such as the attraction of minorities to areas 
of heavy industrial use and racial discrimination in sale and rental of housing, questions 
surrounding causation, and the role of siting processes have been theorized as explana-
tions); Lazarus, supra note 7, at 806-24 (discussing the absence of minority political and 
economic power, the role of environmental policy making where environmental protec-
tions are disproportionately enjoyed by whites, the effects of deliberate exclusion and ra-
cial stereotyping, the possibility of minority disinterest in the environment, and the limited 
political and legal resources in minority communities); Light & Rand, supra note 7, at 8-14 
(theorizing that patterns of economic development and the localization of health and 
environmental risks, the relative poverty and political powerlessness of minority communi-
ties, agency siting and zoning policies and administrative review processes, and the loca-
tion oflabor and capital resources may contribute to disproportionate racial burdens). 
36 See Cole, supra note 3, at 524. Mr. Cole notes that personal injury suits that assert in-
juries caused by toxic poisoning have been brought on behalf of plaintiffs against opera-
tive facilities. See id. at 524 n.5. Because these suits often last for years and many plaintiffs 
do not receive any compensation for their injuries, after-the-fact toxic tort suits have "dis-
empowered and disillusioned many low-income communities and communities of color." 
Id. 
37 See id. at 525-30; Fisher, supra note 2, at 301-09. 
38 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 309-10. 
39 See Cole, supra note 3, at 538-41; Fisher, supra note 2, at 303-06. 
40 See Cole, supra note 3, at 530-38; Fisher, supra note 2, at 311-15. 
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erty and the Environment, believes environmental laws present the 
best opportunity for groups to block a disfavored facility.4l His reasons 
are simple: judges are now comfortable with challenges made under 
environmental laws, and such laws are reasonably clear and are largely 
friendly to "credible challenges to improperly permitted facilities. "42 
These challenges focus on statutory interpretation and procedure, 
since many state and federal environmental laws emphasize compli-
ance with the proper procedure for granting siting permits.43 A suc-
cessful plaintiff can win an ol'der forcing the offending error in the 
permitting process to be mended before construction of the facility 
may proceed.44 The resultant delay in facility creation or operation 
can allow the plaintiff time to build community pressure against the 
facility, and sometimes delay itself can be enough to deter siting of the 
facility.45 
There are significant drawbacks, however, to seeking environ-
mental justice under federal and state environmental statutes.46 First, 
because discharge of pollutants is permissible if done in compliance 
with a valid, properly issued permit, challenges to enforce discharge 
limits under such permits will not create a balanced distribution of 
environmental hazards where facilities are already concentrated in 
minority communities.47 Second, some of the major environmental 
statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
its state counterparts, are procedural in nature and do not have sub-
stantive standards regarding the siting and concomitant concentra-
tion of environmentally hazardous facilities. 48 As a result, a delay in 
the siting process or the documentation of potential impacts (e.g., 
another environmental assessment or environmental impact state-
ment) may be the plaintiff's only victory, providing a "reprieve rather 
than a remedy. "49 
41 SeeCole, supra note 3, at 526. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 527. 
44 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 308. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 307. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 308-09. 
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2. Common Law Tort Causes of Action 
In addition to challenging siting permits under traditional envi-
ronmental laws, plaintiff groups have successfully asserted their com-
mon law tort rights, such as public or private nuisance or personal 
injury, against industrial or hazardous waste facilities.5o Such suits, 
however, may present significant barriers to minority communities as 
plaintiffs. First, because the plaintiff must prove intentional or unrea-
sonable conduct by the defendant when bringing a public nuisance 
claim, liability may be hard to establish where the facility is operating 
in compliance with validly issued environmental permits. 51 Second, 
because the plaintiff must have a property interest to bring a private 
nuisance action, many environmental justice plaintiffs may not have 
standing for this cause of action.52 Third, causation in personal injury 
claims may present a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs due to a lack of in-
formation concerning the health effects of toxins.53 Lastly, because 
common law tort claims are typically geared towards the complaints of 
individual plaintiffs, with the exception of public nuisance, minority 
communities may find such suits frustrating and divisive.54 
3. Constitutional Causes of Action 
In addition to applying environmental and tort law, environ-
mental justice lawyers also have attempted to establish environmental 
inequity in the siting of facilities as a violation of the United States 
Constitution.55 In 1994, Luke Cole commented: "[s]o far, almost every 
environmental justice civil rights case brought has alleged only a viola-
50 See id. at 309-10 . 
51 See id. at 309. 
52 See Interview with Denise Antolini, Assistant Professor, William S. Richardson Law 
School, University of Hawai'i, in Honolulu, Haw. (Apr. 19, 1999). Antolini added, 
"[clommunity groups may also face barriers to bringing public nuisance claims because of 
the courts' strict application of the traditional 'special injury' rule, which requires that a 
private plaintiff in a public nuisance lawsuit have an injury that is 'special' (i.e., distinct) 
from the rest of the affected community." Id. 
53 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 309. Similarly, when a personal injury claim is brought, in-
junctive or othel' equitable relief, which is usually desired in environmental justice suits, 
may not be available as the traditional remedy under common law tort claims is damages. 
See id. at 310. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 303. See generally Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the Equal Protec-
tion Mill, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 387 (1999) (arguing that in some cases environmental laws 
can reveal discrimination necessary to prove a violation under the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
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tion of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the Constitution."56 In 
the four published decisions that addressed equal protection chal-
lenges to local government siting decisions, all four courts held that 
the minority plaintiffs failed to prove an intent to discriminate,57 even 
where disparities in environmental impacts were clearly connected to 
race.58 This poor success rate can be attributed to the high threshold 
for proving intentional discrimination in equal protection challenges; 
the plaintiff must prove that the government purposefully meant to dis-
criminate against minorities in the siting process.59 This is a very 
difficult standard to meet because it ultimately requires the plaintiff 
to prove that the discriminatory decision was made because of its ad-
verse effects on the minority community, not in spite of those ef-
fects. 6o Although discriminatory intent may be established circumstan-
tially, the bar set by courts for such evidence is quite high61 and has 
56 Cole, supra note 3, at 538. 
57 See Kaswan, supra note 55, at 432 (citing Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 
799 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd 
mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb 
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp.880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 
1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 
(S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
58 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 304--05. 
59 See Cole, supra note 3, at 539; Fisher, supra note 2, at 303-04. The controlling law in 
equal protection cases where the statute in question does not specifically address race (fa-
cial neutrality) is articulated in Village of Arlington Heights 11. Metropolitan Housing Dellelopmen-
tal Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and Washington 11. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Under Arling-
ton Heights and Davis, a showing of a discriminatory effect or impact alone is insufficient to 
prevail; a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with an intent to discriminate. See 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-66; Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-39; see also Cole, supra note 3, 
at 539; Fisher, supra note 2, at 303-04. 
60 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (elaborating on 
the intent requirement of Arlington and Heights Davis, the Court stated, '" [d]iscriminatory 
purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It 
implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at 
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect on an identifiable 
group."(citation omitted)). 
61 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68. The Court suggested that intentional dis-
crimination could be proven circumstantially using the "historical background of the deci-
sion ... particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes." Id. 
at 267. Also, any departures from the normal procedural "sequence of events leading up to 
the challenged decision ... may shed some light on the decision maker's purposes" and 
"might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role." Id. Substantive depar-
tures may also indicate a discriminatory intent, such as where "factors usually considered 
important by the decision maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached." Id. 
Lastly, tile Court indicated that the administrative history regarding the decision "may be 
highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the 
decision making body, minutes of its meetings, or reports." Id. at 268. However, even if the 
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yet to be met in any environmental justice challenges.62 Because of 
the poor success rate of such claims, Luke Cole has suggested that 
they be brought mainly for "political value" in conjunction with an-
other type of challenge that has a greater success rate.63 The power of 
alleging that a government-funded entity is practicing racism by de-
priving minorities of the core constitutional right of equal protection 
may have unique force in raising community awareness and outrage 
for environmental justice advocates. 
4. Other Civil Rights Causes of Action 
The same parallels between traditional civil rights challenges and 
environmental justice challenges that make equal protection claims 
appealing for plaintiffs also make other civil rights causes of action 
compelling.64 Most intriguingly, plaintiffs proceeding under the statu-
tory provisions of various civil rights acts may be relieved of the heavy 
burden of proving intent to discriminate.65 In the past decade, envi-
ronmental justice groups, EPA, scholars, and local permitting authori-
ties have focused intense attention on one such civil rights statute: 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.66 
plaintiff is able to locate a circumstantial "smoking gun," the burden is still on the plaintiff 
to prove that the defendant acted because the action would cause an adverse effect on the 
minority group in question, not in spite of that effect. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 
62 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 304. 
63 Cole, supra note 3, at 541. But see Kaswan, supra note 55, at 407-56 (asserting that 
outcomes for equal protection claims are highly fact specific and that the Arlington Heights 
standard leaves open the possibility of circumstantially proving the presence of discrimina-
tory intent). 
64 See Cole, supra note 3, at 530-31. 
65 See infra note 66 (discussing Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 834-39; see generally Cole, su-
pra note 3 (placing Title VI type claims third on a four tier hierarchy of litigation strategies 
for environmental justice attorneys); Fisher, supra note 2 (arguing that Title VI is an effec-
tive tool for achieving environmental justice); Light & Rand, supra note 7 (stating that 
Title VI litigation is limited by the political nature of environmental racism); Bradford C. 
Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA s Title V7 Regulations?: The Need to Empower 
EnviromnentalJusticePlaintiffs, 24 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. I (1999) [hereinafter Mank, Private 
Cause of Action] (arguing that courts should recognize a private right of action based on 
the EPA implementing regulations promulgated under Section 602 of Title VI); James H. 
Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 125 (1994) (exploring the use of Title VI as a 
private cause of action and the nondiscrimination implementing regulations of EPA in an 
environmental justice context). 
In addition to Title VI, environmental justice advocates have also explored the utility 
of bringing siting challenges under Title VIII of tlle Civil Rights Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988). See generally Alice L. Brown & Kevin Lyskowski, Environmental 
2000] Disparate Impact Lawsuits 643 
Title VI began to emerge as a possible tool for environmental jus-
tice challenges in the early to mid-1990s.67 At that time, leading envi-
ronmental justice commentators such as Luke Cole and Washington 
University Law Professor Richard]. Lazarus observed that Title VI had 
"promise"68 and a "potentially great" reach.69 However, it was only 
within the past two years that several judicial and administrative deci-
sions interpreted Title VI specifically as it applies to discriminatory 
siting decisions. These developments may threaten the efficacy of Ti-
tle VI in environmental justice suits because they could be interpreted 
justice and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (The Fair Housing Act), 14 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 
741 (1995) (exploring the usefulness of Title VIII for environmental justice plaintiffs). 
Title VIII prohibits discrimination "against any person in the ... sale or rental of a dwell-
ing, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, 
colO!; religion, sex, familial status or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988). SeeCole, 
supra note 3, at 534; Lazarus, supra note 7, at 839. Title VIII has an advantage over equal 
protection claims in that tlle statute does not require a showing of intentional radal dis-
crimination; therefore, an unjustified discriminatory impact may constitute a violation. See 
Brown & Lyskowski, supra, at 744; Cole, supra note 3, at 534-35; Lazarus, supra note 7, at 
840. Also, unlike constitutional challenges, the prohibitions of Title VIII reach not just 
governmental, but purely private conduct as well. See Brown & Lyskowski, supra, at 744; 
Cole, supra note 3, at 534-35; Lazarus, supra note 7, at 839-40. Thus plaintiffs could chal-
lenge not only state permitting decisions, but also local government zoning decisions and 
actions by facility owners themselves. See Brown & Lyskowski, supra, at 744; Cole, supra note 
3, at 535; Lazarus, supra note 7, at 840. 
However, "the ultimate [and perhaps limitedlusefulness of Title VIII['slnondiscrimi-
nation mandate in redressing environmental inequity largely turns ... on the meaning of 
'provision of services and facilities .... '" Lazarus, supra note 7, at 840. Courts have inter-
preted this language narrowly, limiting the provision of services and facilities contem-
plated under the statute to those with a connection to the "sale and rental of a dwelling." 
See Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (refus-
ing to apply Title VIII to the siting of a stadium that would affect a black community 
through forced relocation because the permitting of the facility was not in connection with 
a sale or rental of a dwelling); see also Brown & Lyskowski, supra, at 751-55; Cole, supra 
note 3, at 536; Lazarus, supra note 7, at 840 n.242. As a result, although groups such as the 
United States Civil Rights Commission have argued that services such as sewage treatment 
are directly tied to "development and maintenance of urban areas," courts have rejected 
these arguments. See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 841 (quoting 6 U.S. COMMISSION OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, 1974, at 598-99 (1975)). 
Commentators suggest that Title VIII may be most effective when combined with other 
legal strategies such as other civil rights statutes, environmental laws and regulations, and 
land use and zoning laws and ordinances. See Brown & Lyskowski, supra, at 755-56. 
67 See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 834. At the time of Mr. Lazarus's article, published in 
1993, he wrote, "[olne option not yet well explored by civil rights plaintiffs in the envi-
ronmental context is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. A year later, Mr. Cole 
noted, "[sltrategies for employing Title VI in environmental justice and other cases have 
been well discussed in legal literature, and the approach has been used in a series of 
cases." Cole, supra note 3, at 532. 
68 Cole, supra note 3, at 534. 
69 Lazarus, supra note 7, at 835. 
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to limit significantly the meaning of "disparate impact" and the very 
legitimacy of a private cause of action for such claims. The remainder 
of this article focuses upon those decisions and assesses Title VI's po-
tential as a tool for environmental justice. 
II. APPLICATION OF TITLE VI IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE SITING 
CASES 
A. Title VI, Sections 601 and 602: Discriminatory Intent Versus 
Discriminatory Effect 
To understand the potential effects of recent Title VI decisions, it 
is first necessary to understand the framework of Title VI in its regula-
tory and judicial capacities, both as written and as applied. Title VI 
provides two vehicles under which minorities may seek remedy for 
discrimination in federally funded programs and activities: Section 
601 and Section 602. Section 601 of Title VI70 provides: "[n]o person 
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance."71 The potential scope of Title VI 
is broad: even if an· allegedly discriminatory program is not 
specifically designated for federal funding, the clause "program or 
activity" embraces all activities of a state or local agency that receive 
federal monies.72 Because virtually all state environmental permitting 
agencies receive federal funding for their regulatory and environ-
mental protection functions,73 all actions, including permitting deci-
sions, taken by state agencies funded by EPA are amenable to suit un-
der Title VI.74 
70 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1999). 
72 See Keith N. Cole & Carita T. Shanklin, Environmental Permits as Civil Rights Violations: 
Three Recent Developments in a Rapidly Emerging Area of Law, METRO. CORP. COUNS. 9, July, 
1998, at Col. l. 
73 According to the United States Department of Justice, in 1996 EPA provided about 
$4.3 billion in federal financial assistance under 44 EPA programs to approximately 1,500 
recipients. See U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief at 5, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of 
Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 97-1125) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY 
AsSISTED PROGRAMS 415 (1996». 
74 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 312; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 16; 
David Sive & Lemuel M. Srolovic, EnvironmentalJustice Issues Develap Facility Permits and Civil 
Rights, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 26, 1998, at Col. l. 
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Similar to equal protection lawsuits, however, environmental jus-
tice cases challenging permitting decisions under Section 601 of Title 
VI must demonstrate intentional discrimination to make a prima facie 
case.75 As in the equal protection context, it is difficult for plaintiffs to 
prove improper intent solely on the basis of racial disparities in envi-
ronmental impact. 76 Therefore, direct challenges to state permitting 
decisions under Title VI, Section 601, are not likely to be an effective 
legal weapon for environmental justice advocates.77 
Title VI, however, provides a second vehicle for environmental 
justice advocates challenging state facility siting decisions: Section 
602.78 Section 602 mandates agencies that distribute federal funds, 
such as EPA, to promulgate regulations that implement Section 601, 
and requires agencies to create a framework for processing com-
plaints of racial discrimination.79 EPA's implementing regulations, 
adopted in 1973 and amended to their current form in 1984,80 pro-
75 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72; Light & Rand, supra note 7, at 24. 
76 See supra text accompanying notes 55-63. 
77 See id. See, e.g., Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. 
Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1999). See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72. 
79 Section 602 of Title VI provides in relevant part: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or con-
tract ... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 
2000d [Section 601] of this title with respect to such program or activity by is-
suing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be con-
sistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the 
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken .... Compli-
ance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected 
(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under 
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an ex-
press finding on the record ... of a failure to comply with such requirement 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. Section 602 additionally specifies procedural safeguards regarding the 
termination of funding. See id. See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1; Mank, Private 
Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 12. 
80 See U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief at 5, Chester (No. 97-1125). The original EPA regula-
tions specified that a fund recipient could not, "directly or indirectly, utilize certain criteria 
or methods of administration which have or may have the effect of subjecting a person to 
discrimination because of race, color, or national origin." 38 Fed. Reg. 17,969 (1973). Ac-
cording to the U.S. Amicus Brief, the 1984 amendments to EPA's discriminatory effect 
regulations were not intended to "'change the content of earlier EPA regulations,' but 
rather to express the nondiscrimination provisions 'in simple language that preserves their 
original intent.'" See U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief at 5-6, Chester (No. 97-1125) (citing Non-
Discrimination on the Basis of Race, Color, National Origin, Age, Handicap and Sex in 
Federally Assisted Programs, 46 Fed. Reg. 2306 (1981». 
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scribe recipients of EPA funds from using "criteria or methods of ad-
ministering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals 
to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex 
•••• "81 The language of the regulation contemplates a purely discrimi-
natory effect standard.82 Thus, a plaintiff challenging a siting decision 
under Section 602 is relieved of the formidable task of proving that 
the permit in question was issued with the intent to discriminate; a 
showing of discriminatory effect or disparate impact on the basis of 
race suffices.83 Section 602 holds more promise for environmental 
justice advocates than Section 601 and will be examined in greater 
detail. 
B. Section 602 and EPA s Disparate Impact Enforcement 
Despite promulgating regulations under Section 602 in 1973, 
EPA avoided enforcement of Title VI until 1993.84 Commentators 
have observed that the agency regarded its central purpose as regulat-
ing pollution, and it did not want to weaken this role by revoking 
funding from state and local environmental authorities, or by delay-
ing its own pollution control efforts in favor of policies not directly 
focused on that aim.85 EPA reasoned that even if it revoked funding to 
recipients for discrimination, state and local authorities might con-
tinue their objectionable practices, and pollution control could suffer 
from the lack of funds-ultimately minorities might be adversely af-
fected rather than assisted by the funding sanction.86 
81 Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1984) (emphasis added). 
82 See generally Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1; Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, 
at Col. 1. This reading of the standard imposed by EPA implementing regulations is 
confirmed in the agency's Interim Guidance document, which is discussed in detail in 
section II.B.l of this paper. Additionally, after Congress enacted Title VI, Section 602 in 
1964, the government has interpreted that section as contemplating a discriminatory ef-
fect standard. See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 13-14 (citing Guardians 
Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall,J.) (recipients may not 
use "'criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals 
to discrimination.'" (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964)). 
83 See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 834-35; Light & Rand, supra note 7, at 25. 
84 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 180-88 (detailing the history of EPA non-enforcement); 
Lazarus, supra note 7, at 836-38 (outlining EPA's policy of avoiding civil rights issues); 
Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 17-18 (explaining EPA's early failure regard-
ing the enforcement of Title VI). 
85 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 181-82; Fisher, supra note 2, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra 
note 7, at 836-38; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 17-18. 
86 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 181-82; Fisher, supra note 2, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra 
note 7, at 836-38; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 17-18. 
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However, this pattern of EPA non-enforcement began to change 
in 1993 when the newly elected Clinton Administration began to pres-
sure the agency about its obligation to meet Title VI's nondiscrimina-
tion mandates.87 In response to the growing interest in environmental 
justice and siting disparities, on February 11, 1994, President William 
J. Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898.88 In broad terms, the order 
instructs all federal agencies to conduct their programs and policies 
in a manner that achieves environmental justice and promotes non-
discrimination against minorities and those with low incomes.89 Al-
though the President's order appears clear and was supported by EPA 
Administrator Carol Browner and Attorney General Janet Reno,9o 
significant uncertainty remains today regarding the mechanism, if 
any, for enforcing the order.91 The order itself states that it does not 
create a private right of action under Title VI, nor does it provide for 
any type of judicial review of regulatory decisions.92 While the order· 
officially secured Title VI a spotlight in the environmental justice de-
bate, it did little to clarify how the remedy would be applied "on the 
ground." 
EPA responded to the Clinton Administration's pressure by creat-
ing an Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to address its Title VI responsibili-
ties,93 yet the agency continued to receive criticism for processing 
complaints slowly and conducting secretive investigations.94 Of the 
87 See Mank, Prillate Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 18. 
88 See Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in, 42 U.S.C § 4321 (1994); 
see al50 Bowers, supra nOte 10, at 649; Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1. 
89 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 649-50; Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1. 
90 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 650. Administrator Browner and Attorney General 
Reno issued a press conference on the day that President Clinton signed Executive Order 
12,898, stating the importance of community involvement in siting decisions. See id. (citing 
The White House Office of Communication, Briefing by EPA Administrator Browner and 
Attorney General Reno on EnvironmentalJustice 3 (Feb. 11, 1994)). 
91 See Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1. 
92 See Exec. Order 12,898, supra note 88, § 6-609. The order reads: 
This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the ex-
ecutive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or 
trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by 
a party against dIe United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. This 
order shall not be construed to create any right to judicial review involving 
the compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its agencies, or any 
other person willi this order. 
[d.; see also Sive & Srolmic, supra note 74, at Col. 1. 
93 See Mank, Prillate Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 18. 
94 See id.; David Mastio, EPA Keeps Key Documents Secret: They Contradict New Agmt)' Polit)' 
on Enllironmentaljustice, DETROIT NEWS,July 17, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Mastio, Secret]. 
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fifty-eight environmental justice complaints lodged with the agency 
between September, 1993 and August, 1998,95 EPA came to no con-
clusion on at least fifteen,96 and found none to be in violation of Title 
VI.97 Responding to the President's executive order and to the confu-
sion surrounding its own largely ignored regulations, EPA issued its 
Interim Guidance for Investigating Title V7 Administrative Complaints Chal-
lenging Permits in February, 1998.98 A month later, the agency created 
an advisory committee to assist in achieving Title VI compliance.99 
The Interim Guidance was drafted to "provide a framework for the 
processing by EPA's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of complaints filed 
under Title VI ... alleging discriminatory effects" specifically attend-
ing to "complaints that allege discrimination in the environmental 
permitting context. "100 
l. EPA's Interim Guidance: A Blueprint for Processing Complaints 
The Interim Guidance had the potential to be pivotal in the envi-
ronmental justice movement because it sought to establish a multi-
step blueprint for addressing permitting complaints,lOl and therefore 
would answer many of the uncertainties surrounding EPA's Title VI 
policies. First, under the Interim Guidance, complaints brought to 
EPA alleging violations of Title VI must be written, signed, and lodged 
within 180 days of the occurrence of the "alleged discriminatory 
acts. "102 An act under the Interim Guidance may include issuance of a 
new permit or permit modification that results in a "net increase of 
pollution impacts," or an existing permit's renewal.1°3 
95 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 18 (citing Prepared Testimony of 
Ann Goode, Director of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Before the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Commerce Committee, Federal News Serv-
ice, Aug. 6,1998,1998 WL 12763096). 
96 See id. at 18-19; David Mastio, Murky Rules Stall EPA Race Policy: After 5 Years, $50 Mil-
lion, Agency Hasn't Solved One Claim of Civil Rights Violations, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 20, 1998, 
at Al [hereinafter Mastio, MUlRY). 
97 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 18; Mastio, Murky, supra note 96, at 
AI). 
98 EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Chal-
lenging Permits (Feb. 5 1998) [hereinafter Interim Guidance). 
99 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 19 (citing New EPA Advisory Com-
mittee to Address Rights Concern of State, Local Permitting, 28 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 2441 (Mar. 20, 
1998» . 
100 Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 2. 
101 See id. at 4-6 
102 [d. at 7. 
103 [d. at 8-9. 
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Once a complaint is accepted for review, EPA will undertake a 
five-step analysis to determine whether a disparate impact has been 
created.104 Initially, EPA must "identify the population affected by the 
permit that triggered the complaint," generally determined by prox-
imity to the facility.lo5 Once the population that "suffers the adverse 
impacts" is determined, the racial and/or ethnic composition of that 
population must be established.106 To establish whether a "cumulative 
burden or patterns of disparate impact exists,"107 EPA must next de-
termine what other permitted facilities should be included in the 
analysis and the racial compositions of the populations affected by 
those permits. lOB Based upon all of this information, EPA conducts a 
disparate impact analysis that compares the racial characteristics of 
the allegedly suffering population with that of the non-affected popu-
lation to determine whether "persons protected under Title VI are 
being impacted at a disparate rate. "109 Finally, EPA evaluates the 
significance of the disparity, which, if statistically significant, results in 
EPA making a prima facie finding of disparate impact. no 
If EPA makes a prima facie determination of discrimination un-
der the guidance, the state permitting agency is afforded an opportu-
nity to rebut the finding or to submit a proposal to mitigate the une-
qual effects. lll Even where rebuttal of the complainant'S prima facie 
case or mitigation efforts fail, a party has one last opportunity to avoid 
loss of funding by 'Justifying" the issuance of the permit despite the 
104 See id. at 9. 
105 Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 9. 
106 Id. at 9-10. 
107 Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. I. 
108 See Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 10. 
109 Id. at 11. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. at ll-I2. Specifically as to mitigation, the Interim Guidance states that 
"[ w 1 hen it is not possible or practicable to mitigate sufficiently the public health or envi-
ronmental impacts of a challenged permit, EPA will consider 'supplemental mitigation 
projects' (SMPs), which, when taken together with other mitigation efforts, may be viewed 
by EPA as sufficient to address the disparate impact." Id. at II. This approach appeal's to 
provide some flexibility to mitigation as an SMP can address complainant concerns about 
permitting that "cannot otherwise be redressed under Title VI (i.e., because they are out-
side those consideration ordinarily entertained by the permitting authority)." Id. at 12. 
Mitigation could thus involve stricter permit controls or activities and projects with no 
direct tie to the environmental impacts of the facility. See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at 
Col. 1. The EPA views mitigation as an "important focus" in this process, because mitiga-
tion efforts, as a less drastic alternative to the existing permitting process, may allow the 
fund recipient to avoid the "draconian outcomes" of total loss of EPA financial assistance. 
See Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 11. 
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proven disparate effects.ll2 To do so, the permitting authority must 
demonstrate a "substantial, legitimate interest ... some articulable 
value to the recipient in the permitted activity. "113 These interests may 
include broader governmental interests, such as: (1) whether the dis-
parate impact is weighty; (2) whether the permit in question is a re-
newal that provides demonstrated benefits; or (3) whether a newly 
issued permit is likely to benefit the surrounding community.1l4 How-
ever, EPA will not consider justification where a less discriminatory 
alternative to the current process of permitting exists.1l5 
Throughout this process, EPA encourages the use of informal 
resolution where possible, but ultimate failure to comply may lead to 
denial, suspension, or termination of funding by EPA.1l6 However, 
even if EPA's investigation reveals a violation of Title VI, a fund re-
cipient has many remaining procedural rights. According to EPA's 
implementing regulations, if EPA concludes that a funding recipient 
is in violation of Title VI, the recipient may, within thirty days, request 
a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).117 Following the 
ALl's findings, the recipient is entitled to appeal the decision to an 
EPA Administrator.us While the Administrator has the power to ref-
use, postpone, or discontinue EPA funding to the particular offend-
ing program or "part thereof," the Administrator must first make a 
full report regarding the decision to all congressional committees 
with legislative authority over the program and allow Congress thirty 
days to respond.1l9 Further, should EPA decide to terminate funding, 
the recipient may ask for a judicial review of the agency's decision.120 
Conversely, if EPA's Office of Civil Rights finds insufficient evi-
dence to indicate that the fund recipient violated Title VI, the agency 
simply will report this finding to both the complainant and recipient, 
112 See id. at 12; see also Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. 
m See Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 12. 
114 See id. 
115 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. 
116 See Rachel L. Schowalter, The U.S. Envimnmental Protection Agent)': Fiscal Year 1998 in 
Review, 28 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,721,10,727 (1998). 
117 See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b) (1)-(3) (1999); see also Mank, 
Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 21. 
118 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b) (3) (i); see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 
21. 
119 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b) (3) (iii); see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, 
at 21. 
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1999); see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, 
at 21. 
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and dismiss the complaint.121 There is no mechanism for a frustrated 
complainant to appeal under either the Interim Guidance or EPA 
regulations. Additionally, commentators have agreed that plaintiffs 
cannot sue EPA under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to 
challenge the agency's determination following an investigation into a 
party's Title VI compliance.122 
The Interim Guidance concludes by stating that it is "intended 
solely as a guidance" and does not create any enforceable rights in 
respect to litigation.123 Thus, according to EPA, the Interim Guidance, 
like the President's executive order, does not create a private cause of 
action for claims of discriminatory siting; it creates only an adminis-
trative procedure.124 Following the issuance of the Interim Guidance, 
EPA opened a comment period during which the agency accepted 
reactions from all sectors.125 
Generally, the overall response to the Interim Guidance was 
negative. During the comment period, industrial corporations repre-
sented the largest group to file statements with EPA regarding the In-
terim Guidance, comprising thirty-two percent of all comments sub-
mitted.126 The corporate commentators who challenged and criticized 
the Interim Guidance were joined in their opposition by a large num-
121 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(g); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 22. 
122 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). See Colopy, supra note 66, at 169-70; Fisher, supra note 
2, at 317 n.158; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 22. The APA allows individu-
als to sue a federal agency for failure to enforce its regulations, but only in the event that 
there is no other adequate remedy and when the agency's determination is not already 
committed to agency discretion. See Colopy, supra note 66, at 169. Because the complain-
ant has an adequate remedy, opportunity to bring suit against the fund recipient under 
Title VI, Section 601 and arguably Section 602, courts generally do not allow a private 
cause of action under the APA against the federal funding agency to review its enforce-
ment of Title VI. See id. at 170. Additionally, the Supreme Court has further curtailed a 
frustrated complainant'S opportunity to bring suit by holding that an agency's determina-
tion to take no action towards enforcement, "should be presumed immune from judicial 
review under §701(a)(2)." Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see also Colopy, 
supra note 66, at 169-70. 
The APA, however, may still be useful to complainants. Although litigants under the 
APA cannot challenge EPA's decision regarding a funding recipient's compliance with 
Title VI, one commentator has indicated that plaintiffs could challenge any refusal to take 
action by EPA if that agency actually determined t1Iat the funding recipient was in violation 
of regulations. See id. at 170. 
123 Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 12. 
124 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
125 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. 
126 See The Curporate Backlash Against Environmental Justice (visited Feb. 26, 1999) 
<http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/gallery/ej/>. Corporate Watch identifies itself as an 
"online magazine and resource center designed to provide ... an array of tools that you 
can use to investigate and analyze corporate activity." Id. 
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ber of other private business and governmental organizations.127 The 
complaints from government officials and leaders of business com-
munities focused on the projected negative impacts to job growth in 
minority communities and the lack of input from state and local gov-
ernments in forming the policy.l28 
Business concerns and state permitting authorities expressed a 
basic concern with the post hoc nature of the Title VI regulatory 
scheme because the disparate impact analysis takes place in isolation 
from the state permitting process and after the state permit has been 
issued.129 This raises serious concerns for business, where finality and 
predictability are key to operating a profitable venture.130 Regarding 
problems of predictability and planning under the guidance, corpo-
rate and government commentators have specifically expressed con-
cern as to: (1) when challenges may be filed in the permitting or facil-
127 These business and government challengers included: the Environmental Commis-
siOlIers of the States, the National Association of Attorneys General, the Western Gover-
nor's Association, the Environmental Council of the States, the National Association of 
Black County Officials, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Coun-
ties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1; Jef-
frey B. Gracer, Taking EnvironmentalJustice Claims Seriously, 28 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,373, 10,374 
(1998); David Mastio, Another Setback for EPA Policy, THE DETROIT NEWS, July 2, 1998 
<http://www.detnews.com/998/biz/9807/02/07020019.htm> [hereinafter Mastio, Set-
back]. 
128 See Mastio, Setback, supra note 127. Government and business leaders indicated 
specific concerns for conflict with economic empowerment zones, brown fields initiatives, 
and other attempts to revitalize business in minority and disadvantaged communities. See 
Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1. The pro-business Washington Legal Foundation 
has even challenged the very authority of EPA to promulgate such regulations in regard to 
findings of disparate impact in an amicus curiae brief filed in the Chester case. See Joan 
McKinney, Pa. Case Similar to Shin tech Saga, BATON ROUGE ADvocATE,June 28,1998, at 17B. 
The Washington Legal Foundation's argument fundamentally asserts: 
Id. 
In the section of the Civil Rights Act that deals with federal funding cutoffs, 
Congress reserved this punitive action for deliberate and intentional acts of 
discrimination; but EPA's environmental justice regulations will allow a fund-
ing cutoff if there is a discriminatory effect, even if discrimination was not 
done on purpose. 
129 See Gracer, supra note 127, at 10,375. In the words of one commentator, "[e]ven af-
ter the traditional permitting process has been successfully completed, another unit of the 
EPA could demand additional changes or withdrawal of the permit based on environ-
men tal justice concerns." Id. 
130 See id. 
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ity operating process;131 (2) perceived vagaries in EPA's "disparate im-
pact" analysis;132 (3) whether the funding recipient carries the burden 
of proof;133 and (4) uncertainty surrounding EPA's "mitigation" pol-
icy. 134 
131 See id. The Interim Guidance allows both permit modifications and renewals to 
trigger disparate impact claims; therefore, facilities that have been operating in communi-
ties for years could suddenly be confronted with environmental justice charges. See id; see 
also Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 7. This appears to be true even where the facility 
pre-dated additional pollution sources, or even the presence of a predominantly minority 
community. 
132 See Gracer, supra note 127, at lO,375. Although the Interim Guidance provides a 
five-step analysis to detel'mine whether a disparate impact exists, the guidance does not 
detail issues that are "at the heart of the disparate impact analysis," such as tile "proper 
unit of measure for disparate impact analysis and statistical significance." Id; see supra text 
accompanying notes 98, 116, 123-25. In particular, the guidance does not clarifY exactly 
how EPA will define "affected and unaffected populations," nor does it specifY what statis-
tical methodology is to be used. See Gracer, supra note 127, at 10,375. Because of this lack 
of detail in the disparate effect analysis and a lack of regulatory precedent in this area, 
discriminatory impact siting challenges will necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis 
"against a backdrop of uncertainty." Id. 
133 See Gracer, supra note 127, at 10,375. Jeffrey B. Gracer, a practicing environmental 
attorney, has interpreted the guidance as improperly placing the "ultimate burden of 
proof" upon the permitting agency. See id. According to Mr. Gracer, this view contrasts the 
Title VI regulations under the Interim Guidance to otller civil rights legislation such as 
Title VII or Title IX. See id. Under these latter statutes, after the complainant makes a 
prima facie case of discrimination, tile burden shifts to the defendant either to rebut lie 
prima facie case of disparate impact or to demonstrate justification by legitimate consid-
erations. See id. (citing Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1984». The ulti-
mate burden, however, then shifts back to the complainant to prove that lie defendant's 
business necessity could be met through less discriminatory means. See id. (citing Elston v. 
Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993». In contrast, under 
the Interim Guidance, Mr. Gracer observes that "the state agency not only must establish 
that the permit is necessary to advance a 'substantial, legitimate interest,' but must also 
prove that there is no less discriminatory alternative." Id. (quoting Interim Guidance, supra 
note 98, at 5). See supra text accompanying notes 112-15. Additionally, Mr. Gracer con-
tends that EPA regulation does not require suggested mitigation offers or less restrictive 
alternatives to honor a permitting authority's bona fide business necessities. See Gracer, 
supra note 127, at 10,375. These considerations are especially significant because victory in 
disparate effect cases frequently hinges upon which party carries the ultimate burden of 
proof. See id. 
134 See Gracer, supra note 127, at 10,375. Some critics have attacked the Interim Guid-
ance because EPA characterizes alternatives and mitigation as an "important focus" in the 
process of approaching disparate effect claims, but the guidelines do not indicate how 
mitigation should be applied specifically to environmental justice concerns. See id.; supra 
note III and accompanying text; see also Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 11. Because 
of the newness and originality of the guidelines, mitigation in an environmental justice 
sense is not well explored, and it is not known what measures might be appropriate in that 
regard. See Gracer, supra note 127, at lO,375. For example, could job training for minority 
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While state permitting agencies and business concerns have been 
quite vocal in their opposition to the Interim Guidance,135 it is more 
difficult to discern the view of environmental justice advocates.l36 
Sheila Foster, an Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law 
and an environmental justice scholar,137 offered two criticisms of the 
guidance from the minority community perspective,l38 First, though 
business and governmental concerns criticize the Interim Guidance 
for having vague and unpredictable standards to identify disparate 
impact,139 Professor Foster counters that this ambiguity can cut 
against community groups-a "finding of discriminatory impact is not 
a given. "140 Specifically, she argues that the third step of the disparate 
impact analysis141 creates a kind of "scientific myopia. "142 According to 
Professor Foster, the environmental health of the community as a 
whole should be considered in the disparate impact analysis, not just 
the presence of other facilities.143 
Professor Foster also raises concerns regarding the opportunity 
provided in the guidance for fund recipients to justify a finding of 
disparate impact "based on the substantial, legitimate interests of the 
recipient. "144 She characterizes this provision of the guidance as vague 
community residents or benefit payments to the affected community be offered to offset 
environmental discriminatory effects? See id. 
135 See supra notes 126--34 and accompanying text; see, e.g., National Governor's Asso-
ciation, Federal Interpretations of Environmental justice Claims Threaten State Programs (visited 
Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.nga.org/pubs/issueBriefs/1997 /97102SEnviroJustice.asp>. 
136 Professor Sheila Foster suggests that minority community organizations interested 
in environmental justice may not currently have a solid view on the subject because a final 
guidance on the subject is still anticipated from EPA. Telephone interview with Sheila 
Foster, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter 
Foster, Interview]. 
137 See generally Foster, justice, supra note 35. 
138 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136. 
139 See supra notes 12S-34 and accompanying text. 
140 Foster, Interview, supra note 136. Professor Foster asserts that the standard con-
structed by EPA appears to be very difficult for complainants to meet as applied. See id. 
141 See id. This section of the guidance requires that the investigation identifY "which 
other permitted facilities, if any, are to be included in the analysis and to determine the 
racial or ethnic composition of the populations affected by those permits." Interim Guid-
ance, supra note 9S, at 10. 
142 Foster, Interview, supra note 136. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07. 
143 Foster, Interview, supra note 136. A thorough inquiry should consider the environ-
mental health of the entire community, for example, the presence of toxins in residents' 
homes (e.g., lead levels), or perhaps the relative health of the community, not just the 
presence of other industrial or waste facilities in the vicinity of the facility to be permitted. 
Id. 
144 Id. See Interim Guidance, supra note 9S, at 12; supra text accompanying notes 107-
os. 
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and, therefore, difficult to critique.145 Her principal concern is that 
the guidance could be interpreted in a circular fashion based upon 
the undefined concept of 'justification."146 Despite the document's 
statement that compliance with "applicable environmental regula-
tions will not ordinarily be considered a substantial, legitimate 
justification, "147 such a rationale remains acceptable under the regula-
tions, and it is not clear how much more justification a permitting 
authority needs to demonstrate.148 
In response to the criticisms of the Title VI regulatory procedure 
detailed in the Interim Guidance, Administrator Browner asked EPA's 
Title VI advisory committee and the agency's Science Advisory Board 
to review the guidance and to make recommendations.149 In this ca-
pacity, the committee has held public meetings throughout the nation 
and it released its recommendations on March 1, 1999.150 Currently, 
federal legislation prohibits EPA from using any "funds 'to implement 
or administer the interim guidance'" for complaints submitted after 
October 21, 1998.151 This legislation has no effect on the fifteen com-
145 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136. 
146 Id. 
147 Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 12 (emphasis added). 
148 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136; see infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text. 
149 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 19. EPA's Title VI advisory com-
mittee has representation from state and local governments, indusu'y, and environmental 
justice advocates. Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1. 
150 See Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1; Mary Greczyn, Environmental Racism De-
bate C:«ows, WASTE NEWS, Dec. 21, 1998; NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY, NEXT STEPS FOR EPA, STATE, AND LOCAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Mar. 1, 1999) (available at <http://www.epa.gov/ 
ocempage/nacept/titleVI/titlerpt.html» . 
151 U.S. EPA, The EPA Office of Civil Rights: Policies and Guidances (visited Jan. 10, 2000) 
<http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/polguid.htm>.Seeal50Mank.PrivateCauseofAction.su-
pra note 66, at 20 (citing Appropriations Act for Departments of Veterans Mfairs and 
Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies for Fiscal Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276 (H.R. 4194), 112 Stat. 2461, 105th Congo Tit. III 
(1998»; Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: With EPA as Judge-Up Against the Environmental Justice 
System, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at Fl; Bill Walsh, Law Puts EPA Bias Rules on Hold: 
Industry Targets Racism Probes, NEW ORLEANS TIME-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1998, at A8. "During 
October of 1998, President Clinton signed an appropriations bill that included a rider 
sponsored by Republican members of Congl'ess that places a moratorium on the EPA ac-
cepting new Title VI complaints until the agency issues a final guidance." Mank, Private 
Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 20. 
Congress enacted this legislation notwithstanding EPA's assertion that it would con-
tinue to accept and evaluate complaints relative to permitting under its legal obligation to 
do so, despite challenges to its legal authority by environmental justice opponents. See Sive 
& Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1; see also supra note 128 and accompanying text. Oppo-
nents to the Interim Guidance characterized the moratorium as a warning to EPA "to 
adopt a more flexible approach to efforts to site facilities in minority or low-income com-
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plaints that were pending at the time of its passage, but 42 complaints 
are now pending, and EPA has yet to release its much anticipated final 
guidance for Title VI complaints.152 
2. The Interim Guidance as Applied: An Effective Tool? 
To determine whether the Interim Guidance has clarified EPA's 
Title VI investigative procedure, one must assess its effectiveness in 
application. However, the ability to conduct this type of scrutiny re-
garding the guidance is severely limited. To date EPA has approxi-
mately forty~two environmental justice complaints pending (some 
since 1993),153 but, despite the fact that commentators anticipated a 
decision regarding the Shin tech polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plant in 
Louisiana,l54 EPA has issued only one final decision under the guid-
ance, the Select Steel case.155 The Shintech near miss and the Select Steel 
decision shed precious little light on how the policies of the Interim 
Guidance are applied in practice. 
a. The Shin tech Saga 
The "Shin tech Saga"156 provides rare insight into the way that 
EPA may pursue statistical analysis, such as demographics, in disparate 
impact cases under its enforcement of Title VI, and reveals the more 
munities." See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 20. Environmental justice 
advocates countered by stating that the moratorium would, in fact, have little true effect 
due to EPA's lack of resources to investigate new complaints and decision to delay consid-
eration of new complaints until the final guidance for Title VI was completed. See id. 
152 See id.; U.S. EPA, Status Summary Table of Title W Administrative Complaints (Oct. I, 
1999) (available at <http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/docs/t6s~an2000.pdf>). 
153 See supra text accompanying note 152. But see David Mastio, EPA Ready to Clear Flint 
Mil~ THE DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 30, 1998 (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.detnews. 
com/1998/biz/981O/30/1030014l.htm> [hereinafter Mastio, Flint Mill] (indicating that 
approximately two dozen complaints were currently pending at the time of publication). 
154 See generally Cole & Shanklin, supra note 74, at Col. 1 (discussing the background of 
the Shintech permit and the EPA investigation through July 1998); Leonard Gray, Shintech 
Leaving St. James, Heading to Plaquemine, L'OBsERVATEUR (Sept. 21, 1998) 
<http://www.lobservateur.com/news/ stories/980921 0In.html> (detailing Shin tech 's 
decision to leave St. James and avoid further permit disputes with EPA); McKinney, supra 
note 128, at 178 (comparing tlle Shin tech regulatory case to a similar private right of ac-
tion brought in Pennsylvania); Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 1 (explaining EPA's 
process for determining discriminatory effects as applied in the Shin tech case). 
155 See Mastio, Flint Mi~ supra note 153. 
156 David Cagnolatti, New EPA Skulf1luggery on Environmental Justice (visited Feb. 26, 
1999) <http://wwwJunkscience.com/nov98/cagnolat.htm> (reporting that "[t]he Shin-
tech saga has taken a bizarre turn"); McKinney, supra note 128, at 178 (observing that "fa. 
Case Similar to Shintech Saga"). 
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common battle of values between environmental justice advocates and 
business and economic concerns.157 The case, although prematurely 
terminated by Shintech's withdrawal from the community, was antici-
pated to be the first decision made under the Interim Guidance.15s 
Before EPA released its final decision regarding the disposition of 
Shintech's permit (discussed in section N.B.2 of this article), the 
chemical company suspended its plans to build in the Convent com-
munity of St. James Parish, Louisiana, narrowly averting a precedent-
setting "national test case. "159 
In August 1997, EPA's Office of Civil Rights began an investiga-
tion of Shintech, Inc., a plastics manufacturing company based in 
Louisiana, in response to a Title VI administrative complaint filed by 
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic.16o The complaint alleged that 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality's (LDEQ) issu-
ance of a permit to Shintech violated Title VI and President Clinton's 
Executive Order No. 12,898 because it created a disparate impact of 
157 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. I; see, e.g., Cagnolatti, supra note 156; 
Gray, supra note 154; Vicki Ferstel, Shintech Becomes Test Case: EPA Trying to Apply Nl'lll, Vague 
Order (last updated on Sept. 12, 1997) <http://www.leanweb.org/Shintech_becomes_ 
tesccase.html>; U.S. Chamber: EPA's Mandated Relocation Costs More Jobs than Expected (vis-
ited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.uschamber.org/media/releases/October98/IOOI98. 
htm> [hereinafter U.s. Chamber). See infra notes 386--90 and accompanying text for an in-
depth treatment of the Shintech demographic analysis. 
158 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. I; Gray, supra note 154. 
159 Alan Sayre, ''Environmental Racism" Site Could be Abandoned (last updated on Sept. 18, 
1998) <http://www.sddt.com/files/librarywire.09/09/8/1v.html>. 
160 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. The citizens' petition was co-written by 
the Tulane University Environmental Law Clinic and Greenpeace. See Civil Rights Leaders 
Jackson and Lowery Urge EPA to Stop Louisiana Plant in Major Rights Case [hereinafter Civil 
Rights Leaders) (last updated Aug. 26, 1997) <http://lists.essential.org/1997/dioxin-
I/msg00313.html>. In filing the petition, the law clinic represented St.James Citizens for 
Jobs and the Environment, as well as other groups that opposed the plant. See Ferstel, supra 
note 157. In what became an unusual offshoot to the EPA complaint, Louisiana Governor 
Murphy "Mike" Foster staged a counterattack against Tulane University, threatening to 
strip the university of its state tax exemptions. See Foster Battles with Tulane Over Shintech 
(visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.amrivers.org/mm/fosterl097.html> [hereinafter 
Foster Battles). The governor, who supported the $700 million Shintech facility, called the 
law clinic, "a bunch of vigilantes" and characterized Tulane faculty members as, "big, fat 
professors drawing big salaries trying to nm [business) people out of the state." [d. (altera-
tion in original). Explaining his position, Governor Foster added: 
I have problems with a university that has some public [tax) breaks being 
used to run people out of the state that live lip to the laws of the state. Boy-
cotts seem to work with all kinds of groups. Now I'm not boycotting Tulane. I 
like Tulane. But I am telling some of the alumni to think about their support. 
[d. (alteration in original). 
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environmental burdens based on race.161 The law clinic pointed to the 
surrounding community's predominantly black racial composition, 
the fact that half of the residents earn $15,000 per year or less,162 and 
the significant environmental burdens already impacting the area. 163 
The proposed plant was to be located in Convent, a town in the indus-
trial corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans already known 
as "cancer alley" because of the number of petrochemical industries 
within its boundaries.164 
While EPA worked to conduct an appropriate statistical analysis, 
debate ballooned around the ongoing environmental justice investi-
gation.165 The battle lines were drawn: allegations of "endangering the 
Following a discussion between the Governor and state business leaders, in the sum-
mer of 1997, the New Orleans Business Council, the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry requested an investigation by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court into the legal activities of the Tulane Law Clinic, and that the 
clinic be restricted from such activities. See Environmental Law Clinic Raises Environmental 
Justice ... And a Hostile Reaction From the Governor and the Louisiana Supreme Court, TuL. 
ENvT'L L. NEWS, Winter 1999, 1, 16-17 [hereinafter Law Clinic]. After a nine-month inves-
tigation into the law school clinics at Loyola, Southern, and Tulane law schools, the state 
Supreme Court amended Louisiana's student practice rule. See id. The rules now prohibit 
clinics from representing any community organization that is affiliated with a national 
organization, any clients not eligible under the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) 
guidelines (which defines a poverty income for one person as $10,063 and for a family of 
two as $13,000), any community organization with more than 49% of its members outside 
of the LSC guidelines, or any clients with whom the legal clinic initiated contact and any 
organization which formed with assistance from the clinic. See id. at 17. 
161 See Law Clinic, supra note 160, at 1. The Tulane Environmental Law Clinic 
specifically alleged that the effects of chronically high concentrations of toxic emissions 
were already borne disproportionately by the African-American town of Convent in St. 
James Parish (the airborne toxic emissions in the town already exceeded 16 million 
pounds annually-an amount 67 times higher than elsewhere in the parish, 93 times 
higher than the average of the Mississippi River industrial corridor, 129 times higher than 
the statewide average, and 658 times higher than the United States average), and that 
these levels would be intensified if Shintech was allowed to add over 3 million pounds of 
air pollution a year (including 600,000 pounds of toxic air pollution). See id. 
The community organizations represented by the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic 
also petitioned EPA under Title V of the Clean Air Act to review and revoke the proposed 
air permits issued by the state authorities. See id. at 1, 16. In response to these Clean Air Act 
requests, EPA revoked the challenged air permits in September of 1997, marking the first 
time that EPA ever granted a citizen petition under the act. See id. at 16. 
162 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1; Civil Rights Leaders, supra note 160. 
Approximately 95% of the population within a one-mile radius of the proposed facility is 
African-American. See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. 
163 See Law Clinic, supra note 160, at 1; see also supra text accompanying note 161. 
164 Foster Battles, supra note 160; see Ferstel, supra note 157. 
165 See, e.g., Civil Rights Leaders, supra note 160; Ferstel, supra note 157; Foster Battles, su-
pra note 160; Gray, supra note 154; Sayre, supra note 159; U.S. Chamber, supra note 157. 
2000] Disparate Impact Lawsuits 659 
health of vulnerable citizens"166 who are "already overburdened"167 
with carcinogens and other pollutants associated with PVC produc-
tion versus the potential loss of jobs and other economic benefits as-
sociated with the $700 million proposed facility.168 This conflict re-
sulted in split allegiances within the greater Mrican-American 
community, pitting the Reverend Jesse Jackson169 and the Congres-
sional Black Caucus170 (urging EPA to stop the plant) against the Na-
tional Black Chamber of Commercel7l and the local chapter of the 
NAACp172 (supporting the jobs and economic growth the plant would 
provide to the economically depressed community). 
Shin tech ultimately suspended plans to build the $700 million 
facility in Convent and announced on September 17, 1998 that it 
would pursue instead a permit for a smaller $250 million plant in the 
up-river town of Plaquemine, Louisiana.173 While EPA did not issue a 
final disposition in the Shintech case, Administrator Browner charac-
terized the corporation's decision as a positive one: "[t]he principles 
applied to achieve this solution should be incorporated into any 
blueprint for dealing with environmental justice issues in communi-
ties across the nation."174 St. James Parish President Dale Hymel Jr., an 
advocate for industrial growth in the area, seemed to feel differently: 
"I don't see it as a major victory at all; the EPA dropped the ball."175 
However, Shintech President of Manufacturing, Erv Schroeder, gave 
assurances that the company would establish a broad outreach pro-
gram to "give unprecedented influence to a community in siting a 
chemical factory" including "citizens forums [and] individual conver-
sations with community residents .... "176 
166 Civil Rights Leaders, supra note 160 (quoting Monique Harden, Greenpeace attor-
ney). 
167 Ferstel, supra note 157 (quoting Bob Kuehn, Director of the Tulane Environmental 
Law Clinic) . 
168 See Foster Battles, supra note 160; U.S. Chamber, supra note 157. 
169 See Civil Rights Leaders, supra note 160. 
170 See Sayre, supra note 159. 
!7l See U.S. Chamber, supra note 157. The Chamber of Commerce estimated that block-
ing the plant would result in a loss of 195 new jobs in the Convent community and would 
economically impact related industries such as transportation, communication, and retail. 
See id. 
172 See Sayre, supra note 159. 
173 See id; Law Clinic, supra note 161, at 16; U.S. Chamber, supra note 157. 
174 Sayre, supra note 159 (quoting Carol Browner, EPA Administrator). 
175 Gray, supra note 154 (quoting Dale HymelJr., President of St. James Parish). 
176 [d. (quoting Erv Schroeder, Shintech Vice President of Manufacturing). 
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b. The Select Steel Case 
Although Shintech was anticipated to be EPA's test case for the 
Interim Guidance, the first case actually decided under the guidance 
came about a month and a half later. The case involved the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality's (MDEQ) issuance of a Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit to the Select Steel 
Corporation of America for a steel recycling "mini-mill" in Genesee 
County, Michigan.177 The Title VI complaint lodged with EPA by Fa-
ther Phil Schmitter and Sister Joanne Chiaverini of the St. Francis 
Prayer Center in June of 1998 alleged that the proposed steel mill 
would cause degradation of air quality and public health effects that 
would disproportionately impact "a group of minority ... people. "178 
Specifically, the complainants were concerned about emissions of 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs)-lead, air toxics, and dioxin.179 
The complainants also alleged discrimination in the public participa-
tion process, citing improprieties in the permitting process, the man-
ner of publication of the notice of the permit hearing, and the loca-
tion of the hearing.180 Following its review of the allegations, on 
October 30, 1998, EPA's Office of Civil Rights determined that the 
situation did not result in a discriminatory effect because the health 
effects alleged would not create an "'adverse' effect on the commu-
nity" and the public had ample opportunity for participation.18l EPA 
thus dismissed the claim.182 
The crux of EPA's Select Steel decision was the agency's reasoning 
that "[i]f there is no adverse effect from the permitted activity, there 
can be no finding of a discriminatory effect which would violate Title 
VI and EPA's implementing regulations."183 Using this logic, EPA first 
looked at the proposed plant's projected contributions of VOCs and 
asked whether those emissions would affect the area's compliance 
with the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone.184 
EPA determined that the new plant would not affect compliance with 
177 See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, EPA's Office of Civil Rights, to Father Phil 
Schmitter & Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, St. Francis Prayer Center, at 2 (Oct. 30. 
1998) (available at <http://www.epa.gov/region5/steelcvr.htm>) [hereinafter Select Steel 
Letter]. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
ISO See id. at 5. 
181 See id. at 2. 
182 See Select Steel Letter, supra note 177, at 6. 
183Id. at 2. 
184 See id. at 3. 
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the NAAQS.185 Because the NAAQS provide a health-based standard 
that was set at a presumptively sufficient level to protect public safety, 
EPA reasoned that there could be no adverse impacts to the affected 
population when the VOC emissions are within levels prescribed by 
the NAAQS,186 Where there are no "adverse impacts," there can be no 
violation of Title VI or EPA's implementing regulations,187 EPA's inves-
tigation into lead levels proceeded similarly; EPA determined that be-
cause the steel facility would not affect the area's compliance with the 
NAAQS for lead, the affected population would suffer no "adverse" 
impacts from the facility.188 
To determine whether the level of air toxins the plant was pro-
jected to generate would create adverse health effects, EPA asked 
whether the airborne concentrations would exceed "thresholds of 
concern under State air toxins regulations. "189 EPA also considered 
other major sources of air toxin emissions in the surrounding area, 
but ultimately found no "adverse" impact in the immediate vicinity of 
the proposed mill.190 Finally, EPA considered dioxin, stating that 
"[n]o performance specifications for continuous emissions monitor-
ing systems have been promulgated by the EPA to monitor dioxins. "191 
Without a proven monitor, EPA noted that MDEQ had been unable to 
place such a requirement on Select Steel in the PSD permit.192 There-
fore, EPA concluded that there was "no discriminatory effect associ-
ated with MDEQ's decision not to include monitoring requirements 
for dioxin and that MDEQ did not violate Title VI or EPA's imple-
menting regulations. "193 
Following EPA's treatment of the claims regarding adverse health 
effects, it considered the allegations of improprieties in the permit 
process and notice requirements.194 EPA found no procedural impro-
prieties or notice violations on the part of MDEQ, and stated that 
MDEQ's notice was adequate in part, "because the Complainants took 
it upon themselves to contact other members of the community. "195 
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
187 See Select Steel Letter, supra note 177, at 3. 
188 See id. at 3-4. 
189Id. at 4. 
190 See id. 
191Id. 
192 See Select Steel Letter, supra note 177, at 4. 
193 Id. at 4. 
194 See id. at 4-5. 
195Id. at 5. 
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However, EPA concluded by recognizing that involving impacted 
communities early in the permitting process could have better ad-
dressed many of the complainants' issues.196 "Such consultations will 
better ensure that communities are fairly and equitably treated with 
respect to the quality of their environment and public health, while 
providing State and local decision makers and businesses the certainty 
they deserve. "197 
c. Responses to Select Steel 
Given the recentness of the Select Steel decision, there has been no 
notable commentary on the way that the Interim Guidance was finally 
interpreted in practice. However, one steel industry commentator, 
Robert Chalfant, views the Select Steel decision as a mixed result.198 On 
one hand, he applauds EPA for deciding that an impact must be "ad-
verse" in order to create a disparate effect under Title VI.199 Mr. Chal-
fant quotes the EPA decision with approval: "Some level of pollution is 
'acceptable' when pollution sources are regulated under individual, 
facility-specific permits, recognizing society's demand for such things 
as power plants, waste-treatment systems, and manufacturing facili-
ties. "200 He also voices the concern, however, that the complaint held 
up the permit, and some pending complaints have cost some permit-
tees years of delay. 201 
Although the St. Francis Prayer Center has not released an 
official comment, Professor Sheila Foster sees the language of the In-
terim Guidance and the EPA decision in Select Steel as coalescing to 
create a high standard of liability for fund recipients in Title VI regu-
latory actions.202 First, Professor Foster challenges EPA's treatment of 
196 See id. at 6. 
197 Select Steel Letter, supra note 177, at 6. 
198 See Robert V. Chalfant, Using Title VI to Thwart Mill Construction (last modified Jan. 
1999) <http://www.newsteel.com/features/NS9901en.htm> . 
199 See id. 
200 [d. 
201 See id. This "hold up" was ultimately fatal to the Select Steel Company's plans in 
Genesee Township. See Henry Payne, 'Environrnentaljustice' A Dilemma for Cities, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, May 15, 1999, at A9. In April, 1999, Select Steel, "strangled in red tape" 
created by the Title VI complaint, relocated the proposed plant to Grand Ledge, a rural 
community near Lansing, Michigan. [d. 
202 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136. Although the St. Francis Prayer Center has not 
officially commented on EPA's application of the Interim Guidance, the group appealed 
the EPA's Select Steel decision in March, 1999. See David Mastio, EPA Race Policy Costs Flint 
Plant: Lansing Gains from Environmental justice Controversy, THE DETROIT NEWS, March 2, 
1999, at AI. In their appeal the prayer center stated: 
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"adverse" impacts in the decision. Essentially, she doubts EPA's logic 
in finding no disparate impact because the steel mill met the appro-
priate standards under EPA permitting regulations, i.e., it met the 
NAAQS; as there was no impact according to the permitting stan-
dards, there could be no disparate impact under Title VI.203 This logic 
does not take into account the existing health conditions in the 
community and seems to contradict the spirit· behind the Interim 
Guidance's statement that, "merely demonstrating that the permit 
complies with applicable environmental regulations will not ordinarily 
be considered substantial, legitimate justification. "204 
Second, Professor Foster finds it troubling that the Interim Guid-
ance allows consideration of only the proposed facility and other fa-
cilities in the area in determining whether negative health effects 
might be anticipated.205 This precludes looking at levels of toxins in 
the community as a whole, including existing levels of lead in area 
homes, rather than simply those that are directly connected with 
emissions.206 A more appropriate standard would consider the af-
fected community as a whole.207 
The EPA's decision in the Select Steel case is deeply flawed .... Because of 
the haste with which Select Steel was processed and decided, it is clear that 
Select Steel was not decided on the basis of sound evidence or analysis but for 
improper political reasons, including unrelenting political pressure from 
right-wing advocates and from Michigan decision makers. 
[d. (quoting Julie Hurwitz, attorney for the St. Francis Prayer Center and a lawyer with the 
non-profit Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice). In response to the prayer 
center's petition for appeal, EPA stood by the conclusions and analysis of its original deci-
sion, but refused to issue a formal response as "EPA's regulations implementing Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, make no provision for the Petition." Letter from 
Ann E. Goode, Director, EPA's Office of Civil Rights, to Julie H. Hurwitz, Executive Direc-
tor, National Lawyer's Guild/Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice, Luke 
Cole, General Counsel, Center of Race, Poverty & the Environment, California Rural Legal 
Assistance Foundation, Susana Almanza, People Organized in Defense of Earth and Her 
Resources, Elizabeth Teel, Supervising Attorney, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, Ross 
Richard Crow, Sahs & Associates, Grover Hankins, Thurgood Marshall School of Law (July 
29,1999). 
203 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136. 
204 Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 12. Although this language is found in the 
Justification" section of the document, it seems elementary that if EPA contemplated that 
if a permit in compliance could reach the justification stage of the Title VI process, then it 
must have earlier been found to have had an "adverse effect" and a discriminatOl-y impact 
on the community in question. 
205 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
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As administrative and political battles were waged over agency 
procedures and standards for enforcing EPA's Title VI regulations, a 
parallel debate ensued in federal courts over the availability of a pri-
vate right of action under the act. While Executive Order 12,898 states 
that it does not create a private right of action,208 the EPA Interim 
Guidance permits individuals to "file a private right of action in court 
to enforce the nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI or EPA's 
implementing regulations without exhausting administrative reme-
dies. "209 Despite the wording of the guidance, it is uncertain whether 
Title VI allows individuals to enforce the EPA regulations. 
The recognition of a private right of action under Section 602 
and EPA's implementing regulations are central to determining 
whether Title VI will serve as a tool for environmental justice. Al-
though filing a complaint with EPA is relatively inexpensive and is of-
ten enough to convince a private permittee to relocate,210 regulatory 
enforcement has disadvantages. A complainant has no right to par-
ticipate in EPA's investigation and there are no time limitations im-
posed on the agency.211 Even if EPA finds that a fund recipient has 
engaged in discrimination, EPA's power to revoke funding is severely 
constrained by procedural safeguards212 and there is no possibility of 
direct reliefto the complainant or compensation for attorney's fees. 213 
Finally, not once in the history of the agency's civil rights enforce-
ment has EPA found a fund recipient to be in violation of Title VI. 
In contrast, a private right of action under Title VI would afford 
expanded rights to a complainant. A lawsuit alleging disparate impact 
W"ould provide an opportunity for a plaintiff to conduct her own in-
208 See Exec. Order 12,898, supra note 88, § 6-609; see also Sive & Srolovic, supra note 
74, at Col. 1. 
209 Interim Guidance, supra note 98, at 4. 
210 Telephone Interview with Jerome Balter, Counsel for Chester Residents Concerned 
for Quality Living, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (Mar. 24, 1999); see also 
Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 23 n.132; supra text accompanying notes 
156-76. Professor Mank additionally explains that an EPA complaint can be used to galva-
nize political opposition to a plant and, given the expense to the fund recipient of appeal-
ing a negative decision, the recipient will likely agree to cancel or relocate the challenged 
project. See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 23. 
211 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 22 (citing Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706 nAl (1979); Arthur R. Block, Enforcement of Titk W Compliance 
Agreements by Third Party Beneficiaries, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 10 (1983); Cole, supra 
note 3, at 321; Fisher, supra note 2, at 316). 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 116-20; see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, su-
pra note 66, at 22-23. 
213 See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a); see also Mank, Private Cause of 
Action, supra note 66, at 23. 
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vestigation with full discovery,214 allow her to determine what evidence 
to present,215 and would open the possibilities of equitable relief216 
and the recovery of attorney's fees. 217 Although the high costs of hir-
ing a lawyer and conducting a thorough private investigation are clear 
disadvantages, especially because the court ultimately may not grant 
the injunction or even attorney's fees, some commentators feel that 
the advantages of filing a private suit for disparate impact under Title 
VI outweigh the disadvantages.218 Whether courts will even recognize 
such claims, however, is not settled. 
III. SECTION 602 As A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
While Section 601 of Title VI provides a private cause of action 
for intentional acts of discrimination on the basis of race,219 it is less 
certain whether the disparate impact standard of Section 602 is avail-
able to private plaintiffs.220 Although court decisions in the mid 1980s 
may have implied a private right of action for discriminatory effects 
under Title VI,221 the issue was not directly addressed in an environ-
mental permitting context until 1996 in Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality Living v. SeiJ222 
214 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 24; Colopy, supra note 66, at 167. 
215 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 24; Colopy, supra note 66, at 167. 
216 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 24; Colopy, supra note 66, at 167; 
see also infra note 446 and accompanying text. 
217 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 24 (citing Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fees Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)); Colopy, supra note 66, at 166 n.194; see alw infra 
text accompanying notes 446-64. 
218 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 24. 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 70-77. 
220 See, e.g. ,Jeffrey A. Cohen & Karen A. Mignone, Environmental justice for Citizen Group: 
3d. CiT. Creates New Obstacle to Waste Facility Siting Permits, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. 
STRATEGY, April 1998, at 1 (explaining that courts had traditionally "limited citizen suits to 
Sec. 601 of [Title VI], which ... required plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent to main-
tain a claim."); Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1 (reporting that "it is uncertain 
whether a private right of action exists that would allow plaintiffs to directly enforce [EPA] 
regulations. "). But see Lazarus, supra note 7, at 835 (stating that it is "well settled that Title 
VI provides an implied private right of action on behalf of individuals who have suffered 
discrimination deemed unlawfi.Il by Title VI.") (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service 
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983)). 
221 See infra notes 449-53 and text accompanying text. 
222 See 944 F. Supp. 413,413-18 (E.D. Pa. 1996) rev'd, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) and 
llacated, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998). 
666 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:631 
A. The Factual and Procedural Background of Chester 
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), a citi-
zens group, brought suit on May 22, 1996, against the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) challenging the 
issuance of permits to construct a waste treatment facility in the town 
of Chester in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.223 The formerly indus-
trial city of 39,000224 is now home to low-income people of color, 
100% of Delaware County's solid waste treatment plants, and 85% of 
the county's raw sewage and sludge treatment plants.225 Chester fur-
ther faces the highest infant mortality rate and the highest death rate 
from certain malignant tumors in Pennsylvania.226 While Chester has 
a sixty-five percent Mrican-American population, the remainder of 
Delaware County is ninety-one percent white.227 
CRCQL challenged PADEP's issuance of a permit to Soil Reme-
diation Services, Inc. (SRS) to operate a waste treatment facility and 
alleged violations of both Sections 601 and 602 of Title VI.228 The citi-
zen group asserted that the process PADEP employed to issue waste 
facility permits effectively discriminated against its members by "con-
centrating the burden of pollution and the negative health effects it 
causes," in predominantly Mrican-American Chester.229 The CRCQL 
complaint alleged that from 1987 to 1996, PADEP granted five per-
mits for waste facilities in Chester, while only two permits were issued 
in the rest of the county.230 Significantly, the five Chester permits al-
lowed an increase in waste processing capacity of 2.1 million tons per 
year, in addition to the permit capacity of 44 million gallons of sewage 
and 17,500 tons of sludge already operating in Chester.231 In contrast, 
the two waste permits granted for facilities outside of the city each 
had a permit capacity of 700 tons per year.232 The only census tracts in 
the county that contained multiple waste facilities were located in 
223 See id. 
224 See Foster, Justice, supra note 35, at 779. 
225 See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 414-15. 
226 See id. at 415. 
227 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 n.l 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
228 See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 415. Defendants in the suit were James M. Seif (the 
Commonwealth's Secretary), Carol R. Collier (PADEP's Director of the Southeastern Re-
gion), PADEP, and PADEP's Southeastern Regional subdivision. See id. 
229 [d. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 
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predominantly Mrican-American communities.233 According to 
CRCQL, PADEP's process of determining the issuance of permits left 
"the white residents of Delaware County essentially free of the pollu-
tion their waste caused. "234 
The district court dismissed with leave to amend CRCQL's Sec-
tion 601 claim of intentional discrimination, finding that the plain-
tiffs allegations amounted to only a disparate effect, not discrimina-
tory intent.235 Although the court found that PADEP's failure to 
rectify its permitting procedure amounted to a discriminatory effect 
on the basis of race,236 the court dismissed with prejudice CRCQL's 
claims that PADEP violated EPA's regulations promulgated under Sec-
tion 602 of Title VI237 because it found no private cause of action un-
der these regulations.238 
233 See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 415. 
234ld. 
235 See id. at 417; see also supra text accompanying notes 70-77. Section 601 of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that, "[n]o person in the United States shall, on 
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1999). 
The district court indicated that, based on CRCQL's briefs, not its complaint, it ap-
peared as though the plaintiff could potentially carry a Title VI, Section 601 intentional 
discrimination claim. See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 416. Following a recital ofCRCQL's factual 
allegations, the court quoted with approval CRCQL's brief, which characterized PADEP's 
failure to rectifY "their failed waste permit program" as the "functional equivalent of a 
smoking-gun intentional discrimination." See id. This failure to rectifY could be sufficient to 
raise an inference of invidious intent based on the fact that the defendant's actions had 
the "clear and obvious effect of subjecting African Americans to discrimination." See id. 
(quoting Plaintiffs' Response Brief at 9). The court, however, found that the plaintiff must 
have specifically raised an allegation of discriminatory intent in its pleadings, rather than 
alleging that a discriminatory effect states an implied right of action, or attempting to 
amend its complaint with the "smoking-gun" argument in its briefs. See id. Therefore, the 
court was compelled to dismiss CRCQL's Section 601 complaint, but granted the plaintiffs 
fifteen days to amend. See id at 417. 
236 See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 414. 
237 See id. at 417-18. Section 602 of Title VI authorizes agencies which provide federal 
financial assistance, reading "to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title ... 
by issuing rules, regulations, and orders of general applicability which shall be consistent 
with achievement of tlle objectives of the statute .... " 42 U .S.C § 2000d-1. As authorized 
by Section 602, EPA has promulgated regulations relating to civil rights. First: 
A recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of administer-
ing its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimina-
tion because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of 
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the 
program with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, 
or sex. 
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In coming to this conclusion, the court relied upon the 1979 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision of Chowdhury v. Reading Hos-
pital & Medical Center,239 which the district court construed as holding 
that "there is no private right of action under regulations promul-
gated under Section 602 of Title VI. "240 The district court character-
ized Chowdhury as reasoning that because plaintiffs do not need to 
exhaust administrative remedies under Section 602,241 there is a "basic 
reality" that Title VI regulations do not give individuals a role in the 
enforcement of administrative regulations.242 Therefore, the court 
relied upon its understanding of the controlling authority of Chowd-
hury and refused to find a private cause of action under EPA regula-
tions promulgated under Title VI, Section 602.243 
B. CRCQL's Third Circuit Appeal 
CRCQL chose not to amend its Section 601 claim of intentional 
discrimination244 and instead appealed the district court's decision 
regarding whether a private right of action exists under which indi-
40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). Additionally, "[a]pplicants for EPA assistance [shall] submit an assur-
ance with the applications stating that, with respect to their programs or activities that 
receive EPA assistance, they will comply with the requirements of this part." 40 C.F.R. 
§ 7.80(a). 
238 See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 417-18. 
239 [d. at 417; see Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317 (3d. Cir. 
1979). 
240 Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 417 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 319-20). 
241 See id. (citing Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 321). Chowdhury, which was not an environ-
mental case, explored the question of whether a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative 
remedies before suing under Title VI. See id. The Chester court quoted Chowdhury in that 
regard: 
Congress explicitly provided for an administrative enforcement mechanism, 
contained in Section 602, by which the funding agency attempts to secure 
voluntary compliance and, failing that, is empowered to terminate the viola-
tor's federal funding. Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to this 
section, an aggrieved individual may file a complaint with the funding agency 
but has no role in the investigation or adjudication, if any, of the complaint. 
The only remedies contemplated by the language of the Act and the Regula-
tions are voluntary compliance and funding termination. There is no provi-
sion for a remedy for the victim of the discrimination, such as injunctive relief 
or damages. 
[d. (quoting Chowdhury, 677 F.2d 319-20). 
242 See id. 
243 See id. at 417-18. 
244 See id. at 928. Because CRCQL informed the district court that it would not be 
amending its Section 601 claim, the district court entered final judgment to dismiss on 
that count. See id. 
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viduals can enforce EPA's civil rights regulations.245 On December 30, 
1997, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court 
and, in a (temporary) landmark decision, held that private plaintiffs 
may maintain an action under the discriminatory effect civil rights 
regulations of administrative agencies.246 Noting the district court's 
reliance on Chowdhury, the court of appeals stated that jurisprudence 
after the 1979 Chowdhury decision lent support for a private right of 
action to enforce administrative regulations, and that Chowdhury did 
not apply the appropriate test for determining when a private right of 
action can be implied.247 
Mter generally reaffirming the scheme of Title VI,248 the court 
looked to the 1983 and 1985 Supreme Court decisions of Guardians 
Association v. Civil Service Commission249 and Alexander v. ChoattJl5o to de-
termine whether CRCQL could proceed under the discriminatory 
effect standard of EPA's regulations promulgated under Section 602. 
Although the Chester court inferred that a m.yority of the Supreme 
Court in Guardians had endorsed a private right of action, the court 
did not find this to be dispositive because Guardians had not directly 
addressed the availability of a private right of action under discrimina-
tory effect implementing regulations.251 The Chester court also consid-
ered the Supreme Court's subsequent Alexander decision, but found 
that "Alexander spoke in the passive voice - 'could make actionable' -
245 See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 927. 
246 See id. at 926, 937. 
247 See id. at 927. 
248 Reaffirming the scheme of Title VI, the Chester court stated that a private right of 
action under Section 601 reaches instances of intentional discrimination and that Section 
602 authorizes agencies that distribute federal funds to promulgate regulations that im-
plement Section 601. See id. at 929 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985». 
The court found that the EPA implementing regulation "clearly incorpOl'ates a discrimina-
tory effect standard." [d. Further, the Third Circuit cited the United States Supreme Court 
for the authority that agencies may validly promulgate regulations incorporating such a 
standard. See id. (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94). 
249 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
250 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
251 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 930. Although Guardians was a divided decision with five 
separate opinions, the Supreme Court later made it clear in Alexander that Guardians 
"stands for at least two propositions: I) a private right of action exists under Section 601 of 
Title VI that requires plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination; and 2) discriminatory 
effect regulations promulgated by agencies pursuant to Section 602 are valid exercises of 
their authority under that section." [d. at 929 (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 929-94). The 
Third Circuit found that, while Guardians did not explicitly address the issue of whetller a 
private right of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations, five Justices (Justices 
White, Marshall, Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun) agreed in that decision that iI~unctive 
and declaratory relief are available in discriminatory effect cases. See id. at 930. 
670 Envimnrnental Affairs [Vol. 27:631 
and did not indicate whether Guardians stood for the proposition that 
a private plaintiff ... could proceed under a disparate impact stan-
dard. "252 Similar to its treatment of Guardians, the Third Circuit de-
clined to rely on Alexander because it could find no direct authority in 
the decision that confirmed a private right of action. 253 
Finding no authority from the Supreme Court directly on point, 
the Chester court next considered decisions from its own circuit.254 Al-
though the district court had relied on the Third Circuit's twenty-year-
old Chowdhury decision in addressing CRCQL's Section 602 claim, the 
appellate court rejected this analysis, stating that "Chowdhury says 
nothing about the appropriateness of implying a private right of ac-
tion. "255 Because the Chester court found no Third Circuit precedent 
on point,256 it applied the test that the Third Circuit set forth in 1998 
in Polaroid Corporation v. Disney257 that determines when it is appropri-
ate to imply a private right of action to enforce agency regulations. 258 
The three-prong test asks: (1) whether the agency rule is properly 
within the scope of the enabling statute; (2) whether the statute un-
der which the rule was promulgated properly permits the implication 
of a private right of action; and (3) whether implying a private right 
of action will further the purpose of the enabling statue.259 
252 [d. at 931. The Third Circuit also considered the subsequent Alexander decision, in 
which the Supreme Court stated "Guardians suggests that the regulations [of the Rehabili-
tation Act] ... could make actionable the disparate impact challenged .... " See id. at 931 
(quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 294). 
253 See id. 
254 See id. at 932. 
255 [d. at 932. The court of appeals characterized the Chowdhury decision as addressing 
the extent to which Section 602 and its implementing regulations allowed private plaintiffs 
a peripheral role in administrative proceedings. See id. Chowdhury determined that this 
peripheral role indicated that plaintiffs should not have to pursue a regulatory remedy 
before initiating a direct action under Section 601. See id. 
256 The Chester court considered but declined to rely on "dicta" from the previous 
Third Circuit decision of Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District, 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 
1990), which arguably interpreted Guardians as allowing a private right of action. See Ches-
ter, 132 F.3d at 932-33. The Chester court quoted the language in question: "[a] ... majority 
[in Guardians] seemed to suggest that proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish 
liability when suit is brought to enforce the regulations rather than the statute itself." /d. at 
932 (quoting Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 788). The Chester court differentiated Pfeiffer by clarifying 
that it had addressed discriminatory intent, not discriminatory effect, that it did not con-
sider the status of a private right of action under Section 602, and that Pfeiffer did not spec-
ify who may bring suit to enforce the regulations. See id. at 933. 
257 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988) 
258 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 933. 
259 [d. (quoting Polaroid C01P., 862 F.2d at 994) (citations omitted). 
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As to the first prong of the test, the Chester court found that EPA's 
discriminatory effect regulations are within the scope of Title VI. 260 
The court determined that the first prong was met because "actions 
having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities [can] be re-
dressed through agency regulations designed to implement the pur-
poses of Title VI. "261 
To address the second prong of the test, whether the statute un-
der which the rule was promulgated properly permits the implication 
of a private right of action, the court considered two of the factors set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash262: "(l) whether there is 
'any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to cre-
ate such remedy or to deny one'; and (2) whether it is 'consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiff.' "263 In applying the first Cort factor, the Ches-
ter court asked whether Congress indicated an intent to create a pri-
vate right of action when it amended Title VI.264 To decide whether 
the act's legislative history evidenced a congressional understanding 
of the discriminatory effect regulations and an intent that private par-
ties could enforce them, the Chester court considered a House Report 
on an early version of the bill,265 two legislators' comments in the Con-
gressional Record,266 and a compilation of congressional hearings testi-
260 See id. 
261 Id. at 933 (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293). 
262 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
263 Chester, 132 F.3d at 933 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78). 
264 See id. According to the court, "[t]he purpose of the amendment was to broaden 
the scope of the coverage of Title VI in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Grove 
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), where the Court narrowly construed the terms 
'program or activity.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
265 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 934. The version of the bill stated that the "private right of 
action which allows a private individual or entity to sue to enforce Title IX would continue 
to provide the vehicle to test [certain] regulations in Title IX and their expanded meaning 
to their outermost limits." H.R. REp. No. 99-963, pI. 1, (1986). The Chester court noted that 
courts have traditionally regarded Title IX and Title VI jurisprudence as largely inter-
changeable and that the drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted 
and applied as had Title VI. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 934 n.12 (citing Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979». 
266 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 934. The court examined the comments of Senator Hatch 
who stated: 
The failure to provide a particular share of contract opportunities to minor-
ity-owned businesses, for example, could lead Federal agencies to undertake 
enforcement action asserting that the failure to provide more contracts to 
minority-owned firms, standing alone, is discriminatory under agency dispa-
rate impact regulations implementing Title VI .... Of course, advocacy 
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mony,267 which had been offered by the United States as amicus for 
CRCQL.268 Because PADEP could not cite any statements that under-
mined the evidence offered by the United States, the court found that 
there was "some indication" in the legislative history to create a pri-
vate right of action in satisfaction of the first Cort factor.269 
groups will be able to bring private lawsuits making the same allegations be-
fore federal judges. 
Id. (quoting 134 CONGo REc. 4257 (1988». Representative Fields stated similarly, "If a 
greater percentage of minority than white students fail a bar exam or a medical exam ... 
will a State be subject to private lawsuits because the tests have a disproportionate impact 
on minorities .... " Id. (quoting 130 CONGo REc. 18,880 (1984». 
267 See id. Among the compilations presented was· a memorandum by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) that stated that "every licensed attorney would be em-
powered to file suit to enforce the 'effects test' regulations of agencies, challenging prac-
tices in every aspect of every institution that receives any Federal assistance." Id. (quoting 
Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate 
Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Congo (1984». 
268 See id. at 933-34. The United States as amicus for the plaintiffs had advanced the 
arguments that the court ultimately relied upon as part of its larger theory that Congress 
had "acknowledged the existence of a privately enforceable discriminatory effects stan-
dard" when it amended Title VI with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. Amicus Brief 
of the United States at 19, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 
925 (3rd Cir. 1997) (No. 97-1125). The United States asserted that during the congres-
sional proceedings tllat preceded the enactment of tile 1987 Act, "Congress was aware that 
the Supreme Court in Guardians had upheld agency discriminatory effects regulations as 
valid." Id. at 20. "Both supporters and opponents of the amendments expressly stated that 
private plaintiffs would be able to sue recipients of federal funds for violation of the regu-
lations." Id. As support, the United States: (1) offered statements from a House Report on 
the early version of the bill (H.R. REp. No. 99-963, pt. 1, (1986», statements of Senator 
Hatch (134 CONGo REc. 4257 (1988» and Representative Fields (130 CONGo REc. 18,880 
(1984»; (2) noted that witnesses to the hearings claimed that the discriminatory effects 
regulations existed and could be enforced by private parties (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1985: Joint Hearing on H.R. 700 Before the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor and the Subcomm. on 
Civil & Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Congo 1095, 1099 (1985); Civil 
Rights Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 98th Congo 153-54,200 (1984»; and (3) noted that the understanding of a 
private right of action was put forth by the executive branch in a memorandum from the 
OMB (Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Congo 527 (1984». See Amicus Brief of the United States at 
20-22, Chester (No. 97-1125). The United States argued that, given Congress's awareness 
that tile discriminatory effects regulations could be enforced by private parties, and given 
that Congress did not expressly indicate an intent not to allow private enforceability when 
it enacted the 1984 and 1987 amendments, Congress therefore ratified that the discrimi-
natory effects standard would be open to private enforcement. See id. at 23. 
The Chester court concluded that tile above history constituted "some indication" of 
Congressional intent to imply a private right of action under the Title VI regulations, but 
did not cite to the United States's third argument regarding witnesses to the hearings. See 
Chester, 132 F.3d at 934; see infra text accompanying note 269. 
269 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 934. PADEP countered the United States' argument by assert-
ing that the sole purpose of the Civil Rights Restoration Act's amendment to Title VI was 
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The second Cart factor requires a court to determine whether it is 
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff .... "270 According to PADEP, 
this was not the case because Section 602 and its regulations, which 
include strict notice, filing, and time line requirements, are meant to 
establish EPA as a gatekeeper to enforcement.271 PADEP also argued 
that the EPA regulations provide a sufficient administrative remedy to 
private parties who allege unintentional discrimination.272 Therefore, 
PADEP asserted, the appropriate legislative scheme for enforcing Sec-
tion 602 and its regulations is for private parties to submit allegations 
of discriminatory effects to EPA, which will act as a discretionary gate-
keeper.273 
In considering PADEP's arguments, the Chester court looked at 
the purpose of the procedural requirements of the EPA regulations 
and determined that their principal aim was to provide fund recipi-
ents with notice of investigation.274 The court stated that a private law-
suit would afford a similar opportunity for notice to a fund recipi-
ent. 275 The court also clarified that the strict procedural requirements 
of the EPA regulations are in place because of the potentially onerous 
remedy under the regulatory scheme-loss of funding. 276 Because 
to address the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City College v.Bel~ 465 U.S. 555 
(1984), by expanding the definition of the term "program or activity," not to consider a 
private right of action. See Brief for Appellees at 18, Chester (No. 97-1125). In Grove City, by 
narrowly defining the term "program or activity," the Supreme Court held that federal 
funds received by a subunit of an institution did not bring the entire institution within the 
nondiscrimination mandates of Title IX. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573; see also Mank, Pri-
vate Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 42. PADEP argued that neither Grove City, nor the 
amendments, explicitly or implicitly addressed the private right of action issue regarding 
Title VI regulations. See Brieffor Appellees at 18, Chester (No. 97-1125). 
Additionally, PADEP cautioned that the comments cited by the United States might 
only reflect the viewpoints of those particular members of Congress, not the legislative 
intent as a whole and should not be construed as ratification. See id. at 19. 
270 See Brief for Appellees at 19, Chester (No. 97-1125) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66,78 (1975)). 
271 See id. PADEP specifically referenced the strict notice requirements, filing require-
ments, and time line delineated in the EPA regulations, but not ill the statute, and argued 
that tllese strict procedural requirements would theoretically not apply to private plaintiffs, 
rendering a private right of action inappropriate. See Brief for Appellees at 19-22, Chester 
(No. 97-1125); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1999); Chester, 132 F.3d at 935. 
272 See Brief for Appellees at 19, Chester (No. 97-1125) (citing 40 c.F.R. § 7.120(a)); see 
also Chester, 132 F.3d at 935. 
273 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 935. According to PADEP, a private right of action would be 
inconsistent with this procedure. See id. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
276 See id. at 936. 
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private plaintiffs could not effect such a remedy, the court reasoned 
that the need for such stringent requirements is not as significant in 
private rights of action.277 Thus, the court did not agree with PADEP's 
contention that implying a private right of action was inconsistent 
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme of Section 
602.278 
In sum, the court found both Cart factors had been met: (1) 
there was an indication of a legislative intent to create a private right 
of action; and (2) such a creation would be consistent with the legisla-
tive scheme of Title VI.279 Therefore, "the statute under which the 
rule was promulgated properly permits the implication of a private 
righ t of action," satisfYing the second prong of the three-part test. 280 
Having found that the first two prongs of the test were met, the 
court turned to the third: "whether implying a private right of action 
will further the purpose of the enabling statute. "281 In this regard, the 
amicus United States argued that private litigation under Section 602 
and the regulations would further the dual purposes of Title VI to 
fight discrimination by entities that receive federal funds and to offer 
citizens an effective defense against discrimination.282 By "deputizing 
private attorneys general" who could enforce Section 602 and the im-
plementing regulations, a private right of action would further both 
purposes of Title VI.283 To the extent that a private right of action 
would increase enforcement of Title VI, the court agreed with the 
amicus and found that the third prong of the test was met.284 
Mter finding that all three prongs of the Polaroid test were sa-
tisfied, and, thus, that it would be proper to imply a private right of 
action to enforce the EPA regulations,285 the court reflected on deci-
277 See id. The court noted that while "it is well established that private plaintiffs do not 
have the authority to compel a termination of funding," it would not make a determina-
tion itself regarding appropriate relief. Id. at 935-36 & n.15 (citing NAACP v. Medical Ctr., 
Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 n.27 (3d Cir. 1997); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 
(1979) ). Instead, the Chester court stated that should relief be warranted, it would allow the 
district court to determine the appropriate remedy. See id. 
278 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 936. 
279 See id. 
280 Id. (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (1998». 
281 Id. (quoting Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 
1985) ). 
282 See id. (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704). 
283 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 936. 
284 See id. 
285 See id. at 933, 936. 
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sions in other jurisdictions.286 The Chester court acknowledged that the 
specific question at issue had not been addressed by other appellate 
courts and then cited holdings from eight other federal circuits that 
"indicate support" for its reasoning. 287 
In conclusion, on December 30, 1997, the Third Circuit reversed 
and remanded the district court decision, holding that private plain-
tiffs may maintain an action under the discriminatory effect regula-
tions promulgated by federal agencies pursuant to Title VI, Section 
602.288 
C. The Supreme Court Appeal 
Three months after the Third Circuit decision, PADEP filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, and on June 8, 1998, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a private right of ac-
286 See id. at 936. 
287 See id. at 936-37. The court cited ten decisions from eight different circuits. See id. 
288 See Chester, 132 F.3d at 937. Professor Mank, in his substantive critique of the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision, argues that the Chester court's reasoning regarding the 
first and third factors of the Polaroid test was strong (i.e., EPA's regulations were properly 
within the scope of Title VI and a private right of action advances Title VI's purposes), yet 
he criticized the court's argument regarding the second factor, congressional intent. See 
Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 38-49. Professor Mank contends that the 
Chester court's evidence of intent fails in light of recent Supreme Court decisions address-
ing the amount of evidence that courts must weigh to find that Congress intended to es-
tablish a private right of action. See id. at 38-49, 44 n.255. Specifically, he argues that "sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions suggest that a private right of action may be implied by 
courts only if the original Congress enacting the statute intended to create a private right, 
or a subsequent Congress explicitly amended the statute to do so." Id. at 44. Professor 
Mank also raises a question regarding the Chester court's reliance on subsequent legislative 
history. See id. at 44-45. In short, "[iJn 1964, when it enacted Title VI, Congress probably 
never considered whether it wished to establish a private right to sue under Section 602 or 
under 601. [And] [s]ubsequent Congresses have not resolved the issue .... " See id. at 46. 
Professor Mank, however, offers what he considers to be "a stronger argument than 
the Third Circuit's for concluding that EPA's regulations under Section 602 of Title VI 
create an implied right of action." [d. at 38. In this regard, he asserts that consistency with 
Section 601, for which the Supreme Court applied a mOl"e lenient standard to recognize a 
right of action, would be offended by applying today's more stringent standard to Section 
602. See id. at 38, 53-58. This is especially so because "Sections 601 and 602 are interrelated 
and serve the same statutory purpose." [d. at 53. Although Professor Mank acknowledges 
that the evidence of legislative intent to create a private right of action under Title VI is 
relatively weak, he concludes that under the standards that the Supreme Court applied to 
Section 601 approximately 20 years ago, "the fact that a private right of action will protect 
Title VI's dual purposes of combating discrimination by fund recipients and protecting 
individual rights should be enough to imply tllat Congress intended to infer a private right 
of action under Title VI's Section 602 implementing regulations." !d. at 54, 58. 
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tion exists under Section 602 of Title VI.289 The case promised to be 
the seminal decision that settled the question of whether individuals 
could enforce EPA's potentially powerful disparate effect regulations. 
However, a procedural development at the state level ultimately led to 
a surprising result. 
On December 6, 1996, PADEP denied SRS's request for a "plan 
approval permit" extension.290 SRS appealed the denial of this exten-
sion, and pursued three separate appeals, a process that was ongoing 
almost a year and a half later.291 During the "plan approval permit" 
appeals process, on March 6, 1998, PADEP advised SRS that it was de-
linquent in making its bond payments for 1996 and 1997 (as required 
by SRS's "waste permit" and state law) and requested that SRS make 
immediate deposits.292 On April 27, 1998, SRS notified PADEP that it 
wished to withdraw the "plan approval permit" and have all bonds and 
deposits returned.293 Three days later, PADEP officially revoked SRS's 
"plan approval permit," one month after the agency had filed its peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari.294 
Three months after PADEP revoked SRS's "plan approval per-
mit," CRCQL filed a motion to dismiss PADEP's writ petition as moot 
based on the revocation of SRS's permit and the fact that SRS no 
longer planned to operate in Chester.295 Essentially, CRCQL asserted 
that the permit revocation eliminated the actual controversy between 
the parties.296 CRCQL additionally argued that it no longer met the 
289 See Respondent's Brief at 2, 5, Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Liv-
ing (U.S. 1998) (No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 435980. According to Jerome Balter, 
counsel for CRCQL, PADEP had originally indicated that it did not intend to appeal the 
Third Circuit's decision. See Balter, supra note 210. Shortly after the Third Circuit Chester 
decision, however, a separate private claim to enforce the U.S. Department of Education's 
regulations under Section 602 of Title VI was filed in a Pennsylvania District Court. See 
Powell v. Ridge, 1998 WL [804727] (E.D. Pa. 1998). When "tlle state powers that be" real-
ized that anotller Title VI disparate impact challenge was following in the wake of Chester, 
the state decided to request certiorari. Balter, supra note 210. Mr. Balter indicated that 
both parties were surprised when the Supreme Court granted certiorari because the cir-
cuits were not split on the issue. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 936-37; Balter, supra note 210. 
290 See Balter, supra note 210; Petitioner's Brief at 14, Seif (No. 97-1620) available in 
1998 WL 470120. 
291 See Respondent'S Brief at 4, Seif(No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 435980. 
292 See Petitioner's Brief at 15, Seif(No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 470120. 
293 See id.; see also Respondent'S Brief at 5, Seif (No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 
470120. 
294 See Respondent's Brief at 4-5, Seif(No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 470120. 
295 See id. at 3-7; see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 50. 
296 See Respondent's Brief at 3, 5, Seif (No. 97-1620) (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 
U.S. 395, 421 (1975) (holding that "[t]he rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy 
must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed"». 
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proper requirements for standing as the i~ury was no longer actual 
or imminent.297 Lastly, CRCQL asserted that the controversy sur-
rounding the permit was not within the "exception for cases that are 
'capable of repetition yet evading review. '" 298 CRCQL commented by 
way of a footnote at the close of its brief that, because the petition be-
came moot through PADEP's own actions, it would be inappropriate 
for the Court to vacate the Third Circuit decision.299 CRCQL offered 
no legal support for this contention. 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a brief in opposition 
that advanced three principal arguments.3OO First, PADEP contended 
that CRCQL's claims were not truly moot, despite the revocation of 
the permit, because the complaint itself was broader than the single 
297 See id. at 6 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1983)). Regarding 
the standing issue, CRCQP argued that "through their own action, or at the request of 
SRS," PADEP afforded CRCQL the relief sought in this case and removed the injury, i.e., 
the permit issued by PADEP to operate the waste treatment facility in Chester. See id. at 6. 
298 Id. at 7 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)). Unlike a transitory event 
such as a pregnancy or an election campaign, contentions around a permit will not both 
commence and expire before full opportunity for judicial review. Instead, if a permitting 
authority issues another permit that allegedly violates EPA regulations, there will be 
sufficient time to make a challenge. See id. CRCQL noted that it was only PADEP's denial 
of SRS's permit extension and SRS's subsequent withdrawal that brought the end to the 
controversy in the case before the Court. See id. 
299 See Respondent's Brief at 8 n.3, Seif(No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 470120: 
:!OIl See Petitioner's Brief, Seif(No. 97-1620). On August 6,1998, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, National Black Chamber of Commerce, and Pennsylvania Chamber of Busi-
ness and Industry filed a joint amicus brief in support of PADEP which relied more on 
socio-economic arguments than legal reasoning and did not address the issue of mootness. 
See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 
National Black Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and Pennsylvania Chamber of Bus. and In-
dus. in Support of Petitioners, Seif(No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 457676. The amici 
opened their joint brief by painting a picture of Chester as a city that experienced an eco-
nomic decline in the post-war days of the 1950s. See id. at 3-4. Since the 1950s, the amici 
cited deteriorating home stock, a dramatic decrease in size, a four-fold increase in the 
Mrican-American population, and a significantly poorer population. See id. at 4. However, 
in the 1980s, state and local governments instituted programs to improve the economy 
and living conditions in the city, such as implementing economic enterprise zones de-
signed to trigger tax and financial incentives and to attract industrial facilities to areas of 
the city zoned for heavy industry. See id. at 5. The amici viewed CRCQL as opposing such 
efforts undertaken to restore the vitality of the community. See id. at 6. 
The amici characterized the disparate effect allegation of the CRCQL as follows: 
[CRCQL] complains neither of intentional discrimination nor of faulty 
environmental decision making. Instead it claims a legal right to block a duly 
permitted facility from safely operating in a heavily industrialized area simply 
because industrial facilities as a whole are not distributed throughout Dela-
ware County in a manner that places them equidistant from people of all 
races. 
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claim levied against the SRS permit. 301 Second, PADEP asserted that 
CRCQL belatedly advanced an argument of mootness "on the eve of 
filing ... briefs" after months of representing that a live controversy 
existed, solely in an attempt to evade review of the Supreme Court.3°2 
Third, PADEP argued in the alternative, that if the Court should find 
Id. at 8. The amici argued that CRCQL, and the environmental justice movement as a 
whole, reject the view that minority and low-income communities need.jobs, tax revenues, 
and the government incentive programs (such as empowerment zones, enterprise com-
munities, and brownfields) that encourage businesses to come to disadvantaged minority 
communities. See id. 
The amici contended that, while claiming to benefit communities, environmental jus-
tice advocates seek to ban permanently the siting of indusu'ies and destroy predictability in 
the siting and permitting process. See id. at 8-9. In actuality, environmental justice claims 
drive business away from the communities that need it most. See id. at 9. Consequently, the 
amici asked that tlle Third Circuit decision in Chester be reversed. See id. at 29. 
301 See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Seif (No. 97-1620). Arguing against mootness, PADEP 
cited CRCQL's complaint extensively and asserted that CRCQL had actually challenged 
numerous pennitted facilities in Chester, and had asked for not only recession of the SRS 
permit, but a permit review program and a revision of PADEP's permitting criteria. See id. 
at 2-5. 
302 See id. at 9-1l. Mr. Balter indicated that there is some validity to this claim. See Bal-
ter, supra note 210. Initially, CRCQL expressed an intent to go forward and argue the case 
on the merits despite the PADEP's revocation of SRS's permit. See id. However, CRCQL 
also feared that the Sup.'eme Court had an interest in eliminating private enforcement of 
regulations that did not require proof of intent. See Letter from Jerome Balter, Director, 
Environmental Law Project, to Julia B.L. Worsham (June 9, 1999) (on file with author). 
Then, on June 22, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School 
District, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998), an opinion that made up CRCQL's mind. See id. In Gebser, a 
Title IX case in which a student sought monetary damages from a school district for a 
teacher's sexual harassment and assault, the Court discussed Guardians. See Gebser, 118 S. 
Ct. at 1998 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598). Justice O'Connor considered the fact that 
the school district had no actual notice of the incident and stated that "the relief in an 
action under Title VI alleging unintentional discrimination should be prospective only, 
because where discrimination is unintentional, 'it is surely not obvious that the grantee was 
aware that it was administering the program in violation of the [condition].'" See Gebser, 
118 S. Ct. at 1998 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598). Mr. Balter construed Justice 
O'Connor's dicta in Gebser to indicate that she understood Guardians as "approving private 
rights of action to enforce administrative effects regulations pursuant to Section 602, 42 
U.S.C. 2000d-l. This was particularly important because Justice O'Connor, in Guardians, 
was strongly opposed to private rights of action under Section 602." Letter from Jerome 
Balter, Director, Environmental Law Project, to Julia B.L. Worsham (June 9,1999) (on file 
with author). Justice O'Connor's disposition in Gebser, along with the fact that he saw no 
split in tlle circuits, made Mr. Balter wary of the Court's grant of certiorari for Chester in 
early June. See Balter, supra note 210. CRCQL ultimately decided that it would prefer that 
the Supreme Court first construe private rights of action under Section 602 in respect to a 
different area of law, such as one effecting children's education or women's rights. See 
Letter from Jerome Balter, Director, Environmental Law Project, to Julia B.L. Worsham 
(June 9,1999) (on file with author). CRCQL, thus, decided to argue for mootness, avoid-
ing review of the favorable Third Circuit decision. See Balter, supra note 210. CRCQL, how-
ever, asserted that the decision below should not be vacated. See id. 
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that the issue has been rendered moot, then justice requires that the 
Court vacate the judgment below and remand the case with direction 
to the district court to dismiss.303 
In addition to its substantive legal arguments, PADEP empha-
sized that "events beyond the control of [PADEP] intervened to ren-
der moot those issues directly related to the SRS permit and plan ap-
proval."304 PADEP requested SRS's bond payment in compliance with 
its duties to enforce environmental laws, and stated SRS's decision to 
withdraw its permit was made unilaterally.305 Quoting United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc.,306 PADEP asserted that review of the Third Circuit's 
decision was "prevented through happenstance," and the court of ap-
peal's decision must be vacated.307 
The Supreme Court ultimately embraced PADEP's argument of 
mootness and cited Munsingwear in its August 17, 1998, one sentence 
summary order vacating the Third Circuit decision and remanding 
for dismissap08 As a result, no federal court decision remains on the 
books allowing a private right of action for allegations of disparate 
effect against federally funded permitting agencies under Title VI. 
Additionally, judicial decisions currently offer little guidance as to the 
methodology and standards that might apply in disparate impact 
claims for discriminatory facility siting. The remainder of this paper 
303 See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Seif (No. 97-1620). PADEP asserted the general rule of 
United States 11. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), that "when a civil case becomes moot 
pending appellate jurisdiction, 'the established practice ... in the federal system ... is to 
reverse or vacate the jndgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.'" [d. at 12 
(quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39». The rationale behind this tenet is that vacatur 
"clears the path for future relitigation» by removing a judgment that the unsuccessful party 
was unable to challenge on the merits. See id. (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40). 
PADEP reasoned that, if the present controversy was deemed moot, PADEP would have no 
way to oppose on direct review the position of the Third Circuit. See id. at 12-13. In the 
interests of justice, PADEP asserted that it should not be left adversely affected without 
further recourse. See id. at 13. PADEP argued that vacating ajudgment that becomes moot 
while pending appellate review serves the purpose of returning the parties' legal relation-
ship to its state before the suit was instituted. See id. Thus, "the rights of all the parties are 
preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only pre-
liminary.» See id. (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40). 
304Id. at 15. 
305 See id. 
306 340 U.S. 36 (1950); see supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
307 Petitioner's Brief at 15, Seif (No. 97-1620) (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40). 
PADEP concluded by cautioning the Court that to render the issue moot without vacating 
would "yield the absurd result that a state regulatory agency must stop advising regulated 
entities of the requirements of the law [i.e., requesting bond payment) for fear that the 
entity may elect not to pl'Oceed with a pl'Oject and thus moot a related case." Id. at 16. 
308 See Ch£sfet; 119 S. Ct. at 22-23 (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 36). 
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focuses on what precedent exists regarding Title VI's disparate impact 
litigation procedures and standards, and considers what outstanding 
questions will have to be addressed in the event that courts recognize 
this cause of action. 
IV. THE PARAMETERS, EFFICACY, AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF 
PRIVATE DISPARATE IMPACT LITIGATION UNDER TITLE VI 
Observers of developments in environmental justice predict that 
"[ t] he litigation will continue because of all the ambiguity in the 
guidance and the environmental justice regulations. The questions 
that were raised in the Chester case are still out there . . .. [T] hose 
court proceedings will not disappear. "309 Given the many substantive 
and procedural problems with EPA's Title VI regulations, future pri-
vate litigation for discriminatory permitting claims is inevitable.310 Not 
only will courts have to determine whether they will recognize such 
claims, but, if they do, courts and litigants alike will have many subse-
309 Mary Greczyn, supra note 150 (quoting Eric Bock, Washington attorney). 
310 See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 66, at 60. Professor Mank cites several 
Title VI decisions in cases brought after the Supreme Court's vacatur of the Third Circuit 
Chester decision where plaintiffs alleged disparate racial impact in both environmental 
justice and other contexts: 
Powell v. Ridge, 1998 WL [804727] (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Slip Copy) (citing Chester 
for proposition that Section 602 of Title VI creates private right of action 
without mentioning Supreme Court's vacatur of decision); Cureton v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1998 WL § 1726653 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (denying 
defendant's motion to amend order to certifY question for immediate appeal 
because Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Chester did not raise sub-
stantial doubts about numerous circuit decisions recognizing private rights of 
action because one can only speculate about how Court would have decided 
case if it had not vacated the Third Circuit's judgment); The South Bronx 
Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp.2d 565, 572 (S.D.N.¥. 
1998) (observing that it is uncertain whether private right of action exists un-
der section 602 after Supreme Court vacated Chester and dismissing claim be-
cause plaintiffs ['] allegations are insufficien t to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact under Title VI) .... 
Id. at 60 n.347. 
Upon appeal, the Third Circuit in Powell v. Ridge, followed its Chester decision and 
again affirmed a private right of action for enforcement of agency (Department of Educa-
tion) disparate impact regulations under Title VI. See 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 1999). The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari of the Powell decision. Ryan v. Powell, 120 S. Ct. 579 (U.S. 
1999) (No. 99-527); Ridge v. Powell, 120 S. Ct. 579 (U.S. 1999) (No. 99-574). 
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quent considerations. Standing,311 causation,312 and available reme-
dies313 are among these unresolved questions. 
A. Standing 
The question of who has standing to sue under Title VI is actually 
an issue of discerning the "breadth of the statute's prohibition on dis-
crimination. "314 How courts determine this parameter, however, is not 
settled.315 Courts have applied four different standards in deciding 
whether a plaintiff may bring a private action under Title VI: (1) 
whether the plaintiff is the "intended beneficiary" of the federal funds 
in question;316 (2) whether the discrimination inflicted on the plain-
tiffwill harm the intended beneficiaries of the statute;317 (3) "whether 
the plaintiff can show actual harm attributed to an allegedly illegal act 
committed by the administrators of a federally-funded program which 
could be remedied by a federal court";318 and (4) whether the plain-
tiff's interests fall within the zone of interests that Title VI is designed 
to protect, i.e., a person being discriminated in the administration of 
a federally funded program.319 Additionally, to have standing to re-
quest injunctive relief (but not monetary damages), community or-
ganizations representing impacted residents must show that they meet 
three requirements: (l) the members would have standing to bring 
suit individually; (2) the interests that the group acts to protect are 
germane to the purpose of the group; and (3) the claim asserted or 
311 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 166. 
312 See generally Balter, supra note 210. 
313 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 165. 
314 Fisher, supra note 2, at 317. 
315 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 166. 
316 See id. (citing Scelsa v. City Univ. of New York, 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1140 (S.D.N.V. 
1992); Wrenn v. Kansas, 561 F. Supp. 1216, 1221 (D. Kan. 1983); Coalition of Bedford-
Stuyvesant Block v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202,1208 n.2 (E.D.N.V. 1987)); see also Fisher, 
supra note 2, at 317 (citing Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 
451-52 (N.D. 111.1989)). 
317 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 166 (citing Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant, 651 F. Supp. at 
1208 n.2). 
318Id. at 166-67 (citing Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 
F. Supp. 110, 120 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Shannon v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 436 F.2d 908, 918 (3d Cir. 1970)). 
319 See Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 998 F. Supp.438, 445-46 (D.NJ. 1998) 
[hereinafter Bryant Il]. 
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the relief requested necessitates the involvement of individual group 
members in the suit. 320 
One commentator has asserted that application of the "intended 
beneficiary doctrine" (IBD), which is central to the first and second 
standing theories used by courts, is inconsistent with the logic of the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1987 Act)321 and, therefore, the 
pre-1987 case law that employed the doctrine should no longer be 
followed. 322 The 1987 Act replaced the narrow IBD that the Supreme 
Court had applied to Title IX in Grove City College v. Bell,323 a 1984 de-
cision in which the court held that "federal funds received by a sub-
unit of an educational institution did not subject the entire institution 
to the non-discriminatory demands of the statute. "324 Grove City had 
applied to Title VI cases as well as Title IX cases because courts looked 
to these statutes' precedents interchangeably when interpreting civil 
rights jurisprudence.325 
The 1987 Act legislatively overruled Grove City by broadly 
defining "program or activity" and expanding the "applicability of Ti-
tle VI's non-discrimination duty to include subunits of federally 
funded institutions that do not themselves receive federal aid. "326 By 
expanding Title VI's reach to all sectors of a funded institution, Con-
gress brought participants in those subunits, who were by definition 
not intended beneficiaries of the federal aid, under the protection of 
the Act.327 Thus, the 1987 Act arguably made application of the IBD 
under Title VI inappropriate.328 
In 1998, the Supreme Court clarified the confusion surrounding 
the IBD with its decision in National Credit Union Administration v. First 
National Bank & Trust Co., in which the plaintiff sought to challenge a 
320 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 167 (citing Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of 
Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1017 (6th Cir. 1989); International Union, InCI Auto., Aerospace & 
Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 282 (1986». 
321 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (Title VI provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d-4a and 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988». See Fisher, supra note 2, at 317-18. 
322 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 318. 
323 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
324 Fisher, supra note 2, at 318. 
325 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 318 (citing, by way of example, United States v. Alabama, 
828 F.2d 1532, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1987) (per curiam». 
326 Fisher, supra note 2, at 318 (quoting Sonn, supra note 322, at 1590-91). The 1987 
Act specifically broadened the prohibition of discrimination on an "institution-wide" basis 
to "all of the operations" of the fund recipient. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-259 § 6,102 Stat. 31 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988»; see 
also Fisher, supra note 2, at 318. 
327 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 318. 
328 See id. 
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National Credit Union Administration decision under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA). 329 The Supreme Court held in National 
Credit Union that standing does not require an indication of congres-
sional intent to benefit the plaintiff.330 Rather, the proper test is 
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is 
arguably within the zone of interest to be protected ... by the statute. 
Hence, ... we do not ask whether, in enacting the statutory provision 
at issue, Congress specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff. "331 In-
stead, to determine standing, a court must first "discern the interests 
arguably to be protected by the statutory provision at issue; ... [and] 
then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency 
action are among them. "332 
Since National Credit Union was decided, there has been only one 
Title VI district court case that specifically applied the National Credit 
Union holding to standing.333 In Bryant v. New Jersey Department of 
Transportation,334 the district court applied the National Credit Union 
test to determine whether residents of a minority community alleging 
harm from a construction project that would result in condemnation 
of their homes had standing to sue for disparate impact under Title 
VI.335 The Bryant court found that, "[t]he interests arguably to be pro-
tected by Title VI, then, are those of persons against whom federally 
funded programs discriminate."336 If other courts follow this reason-
ing, standing would likely not be an obstacle because plaintiffs would 
necessarily allege a discriminatory impact in facility siting cases 
brought under EPA's Title VI regulations. 
Even if courts persist in adhering to precedent from the 1980s 
and apply the IBD to Title VI cases, many facility siting suits brought 
under Title VI will likely not be adversely affected.337 In facility siting 
claims, the defendant federal aid recipient is the local permitting 
authority itself whose permitting programs are arguably intended to 
329 522 u.s. 479 (1998). 
330 See id. at 492. 
331Id. (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis altered). 
332 [d. (quotations omitted) (alterations added). 
333 See Bryant II, 998 F. Supp. 438 (D.NJ. 1998). 
334Id. 
335 See id. at 440. 
336 Id. at 445. In Sandoval v. Hagan, another Title VI case decided after National Credit 
Union, the court avoided addressing the National Credit Union standard by finding that the 
plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the contract between the federal fund recipient 
and the federal government. See 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1263-67 (M.D. Ala. 1998), a/I'd, 197 
F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999). 
337 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 319. 
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benefit all residents in the jurisdiction.338 In such situations, if courts 
apply the IBD, there is a possibility that it will not be a bar.339 This ar-
gument, however, does not always achieve the predicted result as 
courts do not always find community plaintiffs to be the intended 
beneficiaries of the local federally funded program.340 In a permitting 
context, where the challenged permitting authority arguably benefits 
the entire population of a municipality, or even a state, courts may 
find that the nexus between the challenged permitting program and 
the plaintiffs is too attenuated to provide a basis for standing under 
the IBD.341 
While the case law is not yet settled on the issue, if courts recog-
nize a private cause of action under EPA's Title VI regulations, it 
seems likely that standing will not present a significant barrier to a 
community plaintiff in light of the National Credit Union decision. The 
recent test set forth by the Court in that case appears to allow stand-
ing under Title VI for those individuals against whom a federally 
funded program has allegedly discriminated.342 This broad notion of 
standing potentially overrules the intended beneficiary doctrine of 
the 1980s343 and is poised to replace the variety of doctrines previously 
applied in Title VI litigation. 
338 See ill. 
339 See, e.g., id.; Sandova~ 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-64 (finding that Title VI relationships 
are basically contractual and, therefore, the plaintiffs could bring an action as third-party 
beneficiaries of tlle contracts between the federal government and the fund recipient, the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety). 
340 See, e.g., Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't of Trans., 987 F. Supp. 343 (D.NJ. 1998) [here-
inafter Bryant 1]. In Bryant I, the plaintiffs, neighborhood groups in Atlantic City commu-
nities, argued that they were intended beneficiaries of a disputed highway extension and 
tunnel because the intended beneficiaries of the project included "all the citizens of the 
State of New Jersey and more particularly citizens of Atlantic City." Id. at 352 (quoting 
Plaintiffs' Qpposition at 21). The court disagreed and found that the plaintiffs were not 
intended beneficiaries of tlle project because, "[t]o the extent tllat potential casino pa-
trons, residents of Atlantic City or resident [sic] of New Jersey would benefit from this 
project ... the logical nexus with the relevant program is too difuse [sic] to provide a basis 
for standing and tlms for subject matter jurisdiction." Id. The same argument could logi-
cally be made in regard to a large waste transfer station or similar facility. 
341 See id.; supra note 340. 
342 See supra text accompanying notes 329-32. 
343 See supra text accompanying notes 326-27. 
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B. Exploring the Procedure and Standards of a Title VI Lawsuit 
1. The Burden of Proof 
While the standing requirement for a private, disparate impact 
suit under Title VI presents its own confusions, the contours of bur-
dens of proof and causation for this cause of action are perhaps even 
more problematic. Title VI does not prohibit the government from 
funding all programs that have a disparate racial impact on a com-
munity, only those projects where the disparate impacts are un-
justified.344 One commentator has identified two frequently cited Title 
VI cases, the 1981 Third Circuit decision of NAACP v. Medical Center, 
/nc.345 and the 1984 Southern District of Ohio decision of Coalition of 
Concerned Citizens Against /-670 v. Damian,346 as clearly outlining the 
burdens that parties must meet in disparate impact litigation.347 How-
ever, the same commentator observes that the Civil Rights Act of 
199p48 (1991 Act), which addressed Title VII, sets higher burdens on 
both plaintiff and defendant. 349 Congress and the courts have used 
344 See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that "Defendants are not per se prohibited from locating a high-
way where it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits tak-
ing actions with differential impacts witllOut adequate justification."); NAACP v. Medical 
Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that "A showing of disproportionate 
effect or impact alone may not establish a violation .... To be proscribed, then, the 
challenged practice must not only affect disproportionately, it must do so unnecessarily."); 
Colopy, supra note 66, at 160. 
345 657 F.2d at 1331-37; see Colopy, supra note 66, at 161. 
346 608 F. Supp. at 146; see Colopy, supra note 66, at 161. 
347 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 160-64. 
348 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (Supp.1991». 
349 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 163 & nn.170-71. Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 (1991 Act) to strengthen Title VII disparate impact protections in response to 
the Supreme Court's weakening of those protections in Wards Cotle Packing tI. Antonio, 490 
U.S. 642, 657 (1989). See id. at 163 nn.170-71; see also Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of 
Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.14 (11th Cir. 1993). Congress and the courts have used Title 
VII as a model for other civil rights legislation, so the 1991 Act could affect tlle way courts 
interpret Title VI protections. See Colopy, supra note 66, at 160-62 nn.158, 163; see also 
Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 n.14. Colopy cites by way of example: 
Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 1980) ('The consideration ofaltel'-
natives t1lat has occurred in Title VII cases is instructive as to the appropriate 
standard for challenges under Title VI."); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969[,982] 
n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (approving use of Title VII's three-part analysis in Title VI 
disparate impact cases); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. 
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (elements of disparate impact 
analysis "gleaned by reference" to Title VII case law). 
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Title VII as a model for other civil rights legislation, so the 1991 Act 
could affect the way courts interpret Title VI protections.35o The pro-
cedure for finding disparate impact in facility siting challenges is un-
tested and it is currently unclear whether the pre-act case law or the 
1991 Act controls litigation under Title VI. Because many courts use 
Title VII jurisprudence to interpret Title VI, however, courts will likely 
follow the standards ofthe 1991 Act.351 
Specifically addressing the plaintiff's burden of proof, if the 1991 
Act is not adopted, Medical Center, Inc. and Concerned Citizens indicate 
that the plaintiff must first present a prima facie case showing a 
"definite and measurable" disparate impact on the community in 
question.352 To establish the prima facie case for discriminatory effect, 
plaintiffs only need to show statistical disparities that are sufficiently 
substantial to raise an inference of causation.353 In contrast, under the 
1991 Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a particular practice of 
the defendant causes a disparate impact based on race,354 unless the 
court determines that each of the defendant's allegedly discrimina-
tory acts cannot be separated from the other.355 Because a plaintiff 
usually must isolate particular practices of the defendant, the stan-
dard of the 1991 Act for the plaintiff's prima facie case is actually 
more rigorous than that required by Medical Center, Inc. and Concerned 
Citizens. 
Under Medical Center, Inc. and Concerned Citizens, after the plain-
tiff has established a prima facie case the defendant has the burden of 
producing evidence that shows "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
Colopy, supra note 66, at 160 n.158. The procedural mechanism for burden of proof and 
production outlined in the 1991 Act should be used as the Title VI standard because it is 
appropriate that the regulation of public spending (Title VI) be at least as rigorous as the 
regulation of private employment practices (Title VII). See id. at 163 n.178. 
350 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 160-62 nn.158, 163; see also Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 
n.l4. 
351 See supra note 349. 
352 Colopy, supra note 66, at 161 (citing Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1332; Georgia State 
Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417; Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 127). 
353 See id. at 161 n.161 (citing Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1334; Scelsa v. City Univ. of 
New York, 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992». 
354 See id. at 163 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (i) (Supp. 1991). Under this for-
mulation, the plaintiff can not simply point to the resultant statistical disparities to evi-
dence discrimination; rather, the plaintiff must show that each element in the defendant's 
overall decision making is discriminatory, unless those elements are incapable of being 
separated. See id. at 163 n.173 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B) (i) (Supp. 1991». 
355 See supra note 354. 
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son for its action,"356 i.e., that the discriminatory decision was a busi-
ness necessity.357 If the defendant does not meet this burden of pro-
duction, the court, in its discretion, may assume that the defendant 
did not have a permissible reason for creating the disparate impact. 358 
However, if the defendant presents evidence that the discriminatory 
practice was caused by a business necessity, then the burden shifts to 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant's justification is actually a pre-
text for discrimination,359 or that the defendant could use other selec-
tion procedures that would have a less discriminatory impact, but 
would still serve the defendant's legitimate interests.360 
In contrast, under the 1991 Act, once the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of disparate impact, the ultimate burden of persua-
sion, not production, shifts to the defendant.361 To meet this burden, 
the defendant must "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business ne-
cessity. "362 Even if the defendant successfully proves business necessity, 
the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to present evidence that 
"other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial 
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient 
356 Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1333; Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 127; 
see also Colopy, supra note 66, at 161. "It is important to note [under Title VI case law] that 
while the burden of going forward with evidence shifts from tlle plaintiff to the defendant, 
the ultimate burden of persuasion may remain with tlle plaintiff." Id. at 161 n.163 (citing 
Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1334). But see supra note 349. 
357 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 161-62 (citing Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 
1417). 
356 See id. at 162 (citing Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1334). 
359 See id. (citing Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1334). 
360 See id. (citing Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1336). 
361 See id. at 164(citing Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417); see also Fisher, supra 
note 2, at 321. Colopy cites Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417 
because: 
the Title VI disparate impact scheme laid out in Georgia State Conference was 
derived from Title VII standards. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989), lie Supreme Court altered the Title VII disparate impact scheme 
by shifting the burden of persuasion on lie second justification prong from 
the defendant to lie plaintiff. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress re-
sponded to this aspect of Warns COlle by returning the burden of persuasion 
with respect to justification to the defendant. 
Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.14 (11th Cir. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, Georgia State Conference properly represents the standard of proof 
under the 1991 Act. 
362 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. 1991). See Colopy, supra note 66, at 163-64. 
Clearly the 1991 Act's "business necessity defense" would need to be adapted to fit Title VI, 
rather than Title VII, litigation. See id. at 164 n.174. 
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and trustworthy workmanship. "'363 Although It IS more difficult for 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the 1991 Act than 
under Medical Center, Inc. and Concerned Citizens,364 this shifting of the 
burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to the defendant makes litiga-
tion under the 1991 Act less onerous for plaintiffs.365 
Although no legislation or Supreme Court decision is yet on 
point, the limited body of recent Title VI case law indicates that courts 
are adopting the distribution of proofs set forth in the 1991 Act.366 It 
seems likely that courts will continue to follow this practice367 because 
it is well established that "[i]n deciding Title VI disparate impact 
claims [courts] borrow from standards formulated in Title VII dispa-
rate impact cases. "368 
2. The Elements of the Prima Facie Case: "Disparity" and "Impact" 
Under both Title VI case law and the 1991 Act, the plaintiff must 
show a disparate impact based on race to establish a prima facie 
case. 369 There is, however, no controlling authority as to what consti-
tutes either "disparity" or "impact" in a Title VI siting case. Therefore, 
plaintiffs may seek to rely on other Title VI cases for indicators regard-
ing how courts may proceed on these elements of the prima facie 
case. 
363 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see Colopy, supra note 66, 
at 164. The defendant must have been afforded the opportunity to adopt the plaintiffs 
proposals for alternative practices and must have refused to do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
(k) (I)(A)(ii); see also Colopy, supra note 66, at 164 n.177. 
364 See supra text accompanying notes 352-55. 
365 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 321; see also Watson, supra note 349, at 971-75; Elston, 997 
F.2d at 1407 n.14 (referring to the distribution of burdens articulated in Georgia State Con-
ference [mirrored in the 1991 Act) as a "more relaxed standard" than that articulated in 
p1"ior case law). 
366 See, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp.2d 1234, 1278 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (following 
distribution of burdens indicated in Georgia State Conference); Association of Mexican-
American Educators v. California, 937 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating 
that "[c)ourts have generally applied the standards applicable to disparate impact cases 
under Title VII to disparate impact cases arising under Title VI. "). But see Mrican Ameri-
can Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 
1998). In African American Legal Dtifense Fund, although the court indicated that the "ana-
lytical framework for disparate impact cases under Title VI regulations is the same as that 
for Title VII cases," the court ignored the scheme of the 1991 Act and declared that the 
burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff. Id. at 338 n.12 (citing Texas Dept. of Com-
munity Mfairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981». 
367 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 321. 
368 Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 n.14. 
369 See supra text accompanying notes 352-55. 
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One of the first issues that plaintiffs must face when building a 
prima facie case is what will be measured and compared in the dispar-
ity analysis: "disparate as compared to what?"370 The small universe of 
Title VI litigation appears to indicate that, when courts determine 
disparity, it is appropriate to measure the racial proportionality of the 
allegedly affected population against the population of the defendant 
entity's decisionmaking jurisdiction.371 Although this formulation ap-
pears simple, it may present analytical and pragmatic problems to liti-
gants and courts alike. 
First, courts and litigants will need to establish what the phrase 
"on the ground of race"372 means in Title VI litigation as it relates to 
facility siting.373 Taken to the extreme, this language could allow 
courts to find a "disparate impact based on race" where a facility is 
cited in a predominantly white enclave within a larger ethnic-minority 
community. To avoid this anomaly, courts could use the EPA's termi-
nology "minority population," which includes ethnic categories 
defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the UC.374 '''Blacks, 
Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, American Indians,' Alaskan Na-
tives and other non-caucasian persons" are covered within that 
definition.375 This categorization of "minority," however, may present 
difficulties. For example, what is the level at which "a given group of 
minorities would be sufficiently large to form a minority population 
or minority community?"376 How should courts approach a complaint 
370 Fisher, supra note 2, at 322. 
m See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1996) (comparing the per-
centage of Hispanic students enrolled at an experimental school with the percentage of 
Hispanic students in the school district); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(comparing the percentage of black students in the state school system's "educable men-
tally retarded" population with the percentage of black students in the state school popula-
tion); Fisher, supra note 2, at 322 (stating that a "challenge to the administration of a state 
enforcement scheme would necessitate a comparison of enforcement in the plaintiff's 
community with state-wide enforcement. ... [Butl if the target of the suit is a facility sited 
by a county land-use board ... then that county would be the universe for statistical analy-
sis."). But see Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 
127-28 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding racially disparate impact not based on comparisons of 
population pools, but solely on statistical data regarding the affected population). 
372 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (1999). See, e.g., supra note 32 (discussing classification of "His-
panics" as non-minorities in Yandle study). 
373 See Gunn, supra note 32, at 1236. 
374 See id. (citing UC STUDY, supra note 20, at 2; EPA EQUITY REpORT, supra note 25, at 
9; Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and Addressing Problems Posed By Environmental Racism, 45 
RUTGERS L. REv. 335, 338 (1993». 
375 See id. (quoting EPA EQUITY REpORT, supra note 25, at 9). 
376 [d. 
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from a community that is predominantly comprised of "ethnic mi-
norities," by definition, but that is located within a state that consists 
of an ethnic blend such that no ethnic group comprises more than 
fifty percent of the population?377 
Second, in addition to racial composition, courts and litigants 
must consider geography in identifying the "affected population. "378 
Here, the time, expense, and effort in gathering statistical data often 
force Title VI plaintiffs into relying on existing boundary lines whose 
demographics are already known. 379 Plaintiffs frequently call the cen-
sus tract, county, or zip code sector in which the facility is to be built 
the affected area.380 The size and geographical structure of these pre-
ordained zones, however, may bear little or no relationship to the area 
actually affected by the challenged facility.381 In some cases, if the cen-
sus tract relied upon is larger than the affected area, then non-
impacted residents will be improperly folded into the statistical 
data. 382 Similarly, using a census tract will not allow for measuring de-
gree of impact since the impact upon those closest to a facility within 
a given tract will be equated to those living at the edge of the tract. 383 
Further, because pre-ordained boundaries may not correlate to the 
actual area affected, those who live near the facility, but across the se-
lected boundary, will not be counted.384 Lastly, such boundaries do 
not account for contingencies such as being down-wind or down-
stream from the facility. 
Additionally, courts may find that merely comparing the affected 
population with the population of the agency's jurisdiction is too sim-
plistic and may be uncomfortable with relying on a formula not de-
vised to address environmental impacts. Courts may instead elect to 
build their nascent formulation of disparity in siting cases on the ex-
pertise of EPA, deferring to the agency's experience with the issues.385 
377 Hawai'i and New Mexico could currently present such a situation, and Texas and 
California will become majority minority states within 25 years. Edwin Tanji, Nation Headed 
for Ethnic Mix Like Isles', THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 12, 1999, at A27. 
378 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 322. 
379 See id. 
380 See id. 
381 See id. at 323. 
382 See id. 
383 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 323. 
384 See id. 
385 In regard to courts potentially adopting EPA's population comparison methodol-
ogy, it should be noted that while EPA has processed 14 Title VI disparate impact claims 
since December of 1993, none of the resultant investigations concluded in findings of 
disparate impact. Letter Enclosure: Complaints Under Consideration or Investigation 
2000] Disparate Impact Lawsuits 691 
In EPA's Shin tech investigation, the agency relied on census data to 
determine the racial makeup of communities within one-, two-, and 
four-mile radii of the proposed plant location and compared these .to 
the racial composition of the state and the other affected geographic 
regions.386 EPA conducted similar racial composition demographic 
analyses on communities around other facilities in the state that emit-
ted toxic pollutants to determine the "comparative universes."387 "For 
each geographic and facility universe, the demographic analysis calcu-
lated the percentage of minority persons within the test radii, and 
compare[d] the results with the percentage of minority persons in the 
state as a whole. "388 Although such a radial study may be optimal,389 if 
courts required plaintiffs to conduct similarly in-depth investigations 
and analyses to establish a prima facie case of disparity, private action 
under Title VI would be prohibitively expensive for community 
groups. 390 
from Dan J. Rondeau, Director, U.S. EPA Office of Civil Rights, to Jerome Balter, Public 
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (August 14, 1996). Given the conflict surrounding 
EPA's Title VI regulatory enforcement and procedures, courts may choose not to adopt 
EPA's constructs. See supra sections II.B.I-2. 
386 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1; Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 
1. For the comparison geographic regions, similar facilitates were assessed. See Cole & 
Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. Similarity was determined by Standard Industrial Cate-
gory (SIC) code, release of similar pollutants, and varying amount of Toxic Release Inven-
tory (TRI) releases. See id. 
387 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1; Sive & Srolovic, supra note 74, at Col. 
1; see also supra text accompanying notes 104-10. 
388 Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 1. EPA indicated that this analysis is not 
conducted to assess the health effects created by emissions. See id. The agency reportedly is 
working on such a "harm analysis," as well as an analysis regarding the results of cumula-
tive impacts of all facilities within an affected community. See id.; Sive & Srolovic, supra note 
74, at Col. 1. 
389 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 324. However, drawing concentric circles around plants 
does not amply address concerns such as being down-wind or down-stream of a facility. 
Additionally, the accuracy of EPA's complex statistical methodology itself has come into 
question with environmental justice advocates. See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 72, at Col. 
1. According to EPA's analysis, it is 73% more probable that an Mrican-American will live 
within two miles of a TRI facility in certain studied areas of Louisiana than a member of 
any other racial group. See id. In contrast, critics of tile EPA methodology have predicted 
that, if the population of tile actual Shin tech site is analyzed, rather than "comparative 
universes," tile data will show that Mrican-Americans have a 400-500% higher probability 
of living in proximity to the Shin tech site than non-Mrican-Americans. See id. 
390 See Balter, supra note 210; see also Fisher, supra note 2, at 324. Fisher notes that the 
"problem of resource expenditure is exacerbated by a recent Supreme Court decision 
which disallowed experts' fees as attorney's fees recoverable by the prevailing party in a 
Title VI suit." Id. at 324 n.202 (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 
(1991». 
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One commentator has suggested that plaintiff organizations can 
best address "disparity" in the prima facie case by using pre-ordained 
boundaries to identify the relevant population and necessary racial 
statistics, but then augment those statistical comparisons with any 
relevant information that helps to create a context for the court.391 
For example, a complaint should explain how the impacts of facilities 
outside of the identified boundary might stretch across the identified 
boundary line, i.e., a landfill site only miles across the county line and 
on top of a common water aquifer. 392 Additionally, the complaint 
might highlight any minority concentrations within a particular area 
of the pre-ordained zone.393 Plaintiffs also should indicate the pres-
ence of additional facilities within close proximity to the affected 
area's boundary line, and the existence of multiple facilities within 
the zone itself.394 The court, therefore, is able to see not only statisti-
cal racial comparisons between the community affected by the facility 
in question and the jurisdiction at large, but also any inequity of bur-
dens carried by the plaintiff community as compared to the greater 
jurisdiction.395 
This "kitchen sink" method of alleging disparity is helpful to 
plaintiffs for two reasons. First, it is efficient because it allows plaintiffs 
to use existing demographic data, yet it still provides a complete con-
text for the court to consider.396 Second, because Title VI case law of-
fers only general outlines for determining disparity, and courts have 
no precedent to follow in facility siting challenges, a plaintiff can sug-
391 See Fisher. supra note 2, at 323-24. 
392 See id. (citing Letter from the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF) to the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights 6 (Sept. 2, 1993) [hereinafter SCLDF Letter] (requesting an 
investigation of Mississippi's hazardous waste facility permitting program)). 
393 See id. at 323 n.195. 
394 See id. 
395 See id. (indicating that while the State of Mississippi produces about 45,000 tons of 
hazardous waste a year, about 130,000 tons of hazardous waste are designated for dumping 
in Noxubee County and its immediate vicinity yearly); see also Plaintiffs' Complaint at 8-20, 
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp.413 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(No. 96-3960). The Chester complaint includes specifics detailing the tonnage of all exist-
ing waste facilities inside the census tract "affected," the permit capacity in tons of the 
contested future facility, the presence and capacity of other industrial facilities in the tract, 
the racial composition of the tract in question, the racial composition of the residents 
within one-half mile and one mile of the contested facility site, the racial compositions of 
surrounding census tracts in the city and the absence of facilities in those areas, the racial 
composition of the surrounding city, the racial composition in the surrounding county, 
and the location of waste treatment facilities throughout the county as paired with relevant 
racial demographics. See id. 
396 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 324. 
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gest to the court what type of evidence it should consider by providing 
a targeted selection of facts. 397 
In addressing "disparity," not only do courts have to determine 
what to compare, they also must decide at what level statistical out-
comes become significant such that a finding of disparity is permissi-
ble-how much must the identified difference be? A survey of recent 
Title VI circuit court decisions does not reveal a suggested statistical 
differential upon which courts can rely in facility siting cases.398 The 
body of Title VII case law, however, is more complete and may be in-
structive.399 
Under Title VII, the Supreme Court has held that statistical dis-
parity in allegations of employment discrimination must be 
"sufficiently substantial" to raise an inference that the alleged dis-
criminatory act caused the detrimental effect because of the affected 
group's race.4OO The Court did not rely on a particular mathematical 
formula to indicate when a disparity is sufficiently substantial, and 
held that case-by-case consideration of all facts and circumstances is 
appropriate.401 The Court additionally indicated that to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact, set mathematical formulas can-
not determinatively indicate sufficiently substantial disparity based 
solely on the statistical differentia1.402 
Although the Supreme Court indicated that mathematical analy-
sis alone is not enough to create an inference of disparate impact, ap-
pellate courts have continued to use a variety of formulas to help 
them identify sufficiently substantial disparities. One such mathemati-
cal formula is the standard deviation analysis, which measures the 
probability that the difference between an actual result and a pre-
dicted result is random: the greater the number of standard devia-
tions between the actual and predicted result, the less likely that 
chance alone is the cause of the disparity and the more likely that the 
397 See Balter, supra note 210. 
398 See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no dispa-
rate impact where school's 50% Hispanic enrollment "compared with approximately the 
same proportion of Hispanic students" in the entire school district); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 
F.2d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding racial disparity where black students comprised 9% 
of the state school population, but 27% of the "educable mentally retarded" population, 
and the odds of a color-blind system resulting in such a statistic was one in a million). 
399 See supra note 349. 
400 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988). 
401 See id. 
402 See id. 
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disparity is caused by other factors.403 At least one appellate court 
used a "common sense" comparison of statistical ratios,404 while four 
appellate courts have relied on an "inexorable zero standard"-this 
allows a high probability of discrimination where no members of a 
minority group are hired despite being in an area with a sizable mi-
nority representation.405 Given the prevalence of statistical analysis in 
Title VII disparate action cases, it is likely that courts will consider 
similar evidence in Title VI facility siting cases.406 Plaintiffs, however, 
also will want to include as many unique "facts and circumstances" as 
403 See Ottaviani v. State Univ. of New York at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 372 n.7 (2d Cir. 
1989) (citing M. ABRAMOWITZ & I. STEIGAN, HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL FUNCTIONS 
(National Bureau of Standards, U.S. GPO, Applied Mathematics Series No. 55, 1966). A 
finding of 2-3 standard deviations equates to a one in 384 chance that a result was ran-
dom. See id. (citing M. ABRAMOWITZ & I. STEIGAN, HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL FUNC-
TIONS (National Bureau of Standards, U.S. GPO, Applied Mathematics Series No. 55, 
1966). Courts have generally determined that a finding of 2-3 standard deviations can be a 
strong indicator of discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 372; Waisome v. Port Auth. of NY & r-u, 
948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that 2-3 standard deviations can strongly indi-
cate discrimination, but refusing to establish a minimum threshold for statistical 
significance); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(finding an inference of race based discrimination where calculated disparity was 17.6 
standard deviations); Emmanuel v. Marsh, 897 F.2d 1435, 1443 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that disparity of 4.9 standard deviations was statistically significant and, considering the 
additional evidence of past discrimination, established the plaintiffs' prima facie case); 
Rendon v. AT&T Tech., 883 F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting defendant's argu-
ment that disparity of 3 standard deviations must be shown and holding that finding of 2.9 
standard deviations was sufficient evidence of disparity). 
404 See, e.g., Frasier v. Garrison lSD, 980 F.2d 1514, 1526-27 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding 
that difference of 4.5% between rates of test passage for blacks versus whites was not 
sufficiently substantial). This type of analysis was widely used in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
Fmsierwas the only federal appellate court decision to use a "common sense" comparison 
of ratios since the 1988 Watson decision. See id.; see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 
329-31 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971); Bunch v. Bullard, 
795 F.2d 384, 395 (5tll Cir. 1986); Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel., Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 
nn.I-2 (5th Cir. 1979); Busheyv. New York State Civil Servo Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 225-26 
(2d Cir. 1984); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Servo Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 
1335 (2d Cir. 1973); Craig V. City of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1980); 
United States V. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 939-40 (4th Cir. 1980); Firefighters Inst. 
for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 510 n.4 (8th Cir. 1977); Douglas V. 
Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Yuhas V. Libby Owens Ford Co., 562 F.2d 
496,498-500 (7th Cir. 1977); Castro V. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735 (1st Cir. 1972). 
405 See EEOC V. Steamship Clerks Union Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 604 (1st Cir. 1995); 
NAACPv. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219,225 (2d Cir. 1995); EEOCv. O&G Spring Wine 
Farms, 38 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1994); Newark Branch of NAACP v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 
792,800 (3d Cir. 1991). 
406 See supra note 349. 
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possible in making their prima facie case in order to assist the court in 
finding "sufficiently substantial" disparity.407 
A plaintiff's prima facie case must establish "impact" as well as 
disparity.408 What courts will recognize as actionable impact, however, 
is unclear. While neither Section 602 nor EPA regulations contains 
the word "adverse" in relation to the actionable "effect," this require-
ment is found in Title VI409 and Title VII case law.410 Findings of re-
cent Title VI cases suggest that the adverse impact alleged can either 
relate to the primary focus of the challenged agency, e.g., schools and 
education,411 or may reflect social or economic concerns that flow 
from the agency's decision, e.g., general discriminatory government 
action and stigma.412 
Such a potentially broad understanding of impact raises many 
questions. First, could impact be satisfied by simple physical proximity 
to a facility?413 If courts adopt this practice, businesses likely will ar-
gue: 
[C]laims will not be limited to waste disposal facilities or 
other purportedly "unclean" activities. On the contrary, they 
will reach "clean"-even "state of the art"-manufacturing 
and service facilities in all sectors of the economy. These 
claims will not be limited to significant or recognized health 
or environmental risks, but rather will address any diversity 
407 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988). 
408 See supra text accompanying note 369. 
409 See, e.g., Elston v. Taladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 
1993) (stating that "a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a facially neutral practice has a 
disproportionate adverse effect on a group protected by Title VI."); Young v. Montgomery 
County, 922 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (stating that "[ilnitially, a plaintiff must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral educational practice has a 
racially disproportionate adverse effect."). 
410 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484-86 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 
that the plaintiff must prove that the policy has adverse effects, that the impact of the pol-
icy is on a condition or privilege of employment, that the adverse effects are significant, 
and that the employee population in general is not affected by the policy). 
411 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-57 (1984); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of 
Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1043 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding in a Title VI, educational context that, 
a tangible impact may be based upon the diminished ability of students to receive an edu-
cation). 
412 See AllRn, 468 U.S. at 755; Grimes v. Cavazos, 786 F. Supp.1184, 1186 (S.D.N.Y 
1992). The Allen court warned that stigma "is one of the most serious consequences of 
discriminatory government action." See id. 
413 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 325. 
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of potential exposure to environmental risks that creative 
lawyers can allege.414 
Courts will need to address whether they will take into account the 
various risks caused by different types of facilities and, if so, how they 
will factor a showing of racial disparity into that analysis. 
There is a second and related question: if proximity alone will 
not constitute an adverse impact, what type of "harm" must a plaintiff 
allege? Will a decrease in property values, a lessening of enjoyment of 
property, or a showing that the plaintiffs were deprived of the benefits 
of equitable program administration be sufficient?415 Or, to show ad-
verse impact successfully, must a plaintiff prove that the facility is 
likely to cause actual physical harm? In assessing harmful health ef-
fects, courts could potentially adopt EPA's reasoning in Select Steel to 
decide when an alleged impact is "adverse." Such an adoption proba-
bly would effectively limit a finding of adverse impact to situations 
where permits do not meet the requirements of existing environ-
mental standards.416 
Finally, courts will need to decide if and how they will consider 
issues unique to siting concerns, such as the role of cumulative effects 
of multiple facilities417 and existing vulnerabilities in the affected 
community.418 Many questions will be further influenced by which 
414 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 
National Black Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and Pennsylvania Chamber of Bus. and In-
dus. in Support of Petitioners, &if (No. 97-1620) available in 1998 WL 457676 (citing EPA 
EQUITY REpORT, supra note 25, at 11, 13) (stating that "[e]xposure is not the same as 
health effects [and] [t]here is a general lack of data on environmental health effects by 
race and income [and on the] environmental contribution to these diseases.") (alteration 
in Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Na-
tional Black Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and Pennsylvania Chamber of Bus. and Indus. at 
29, Seif(No. 97-1620». 
415 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 325. 
416 See supra text accompanying notes 189-93, 203. 
417 Jerome Balter has hypothesized that, given the complexity and necessary expense 
of establishing causation, a cumulative impact analysis will never decide any complaint. See 
Balter, supra note 2lO. 
418 See Foster, Interview, supra note 136. The question here is whether plaintiffs should 
be held to an easier standard in establishing "adversity" or "impact" where the group in 
question is suffering environmentally related health effects and, therefore, is more vulner-
able to chemical exposure. See id. For example, in June, 1995, 60% of Chester's pre-school 
age children exceeded the Center for Disease Control's (CDC) recommended limit of lead 
per deciliter of blood. See Nate House, Westinghouse to Pay $400,000 for Environmental Viola-
tions, PA. TRIBUNE, June 26, 1998, at 2A. It stands to reason that the national ambient air 
quality standards for lead were not established with such a population in mind. What may 
be a safe emission level for a healthy community may very well be quite dangerous to chil-
dren who are already suffering from pervasive lead poisoning. The current scheme of 
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event(s) will be allowed to trigger the permit challenge (issuance of 
the challenged permit, modification of the permit, renewal of the 
permit) .419 All of these unknowns will need to be considered by par-
ties and answered by courts as the case law develops. 
3. The Defendant's Rebuttal 
If the elements of the defendant's rebuttal under Title VI420 case 
law are paired with the distribution of proofs under the 1991 Act,421 
then a permitting agency may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by 
proving that "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,"422 i.e., a busi-
establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case does not take into effect such variables. Courts 
will need to decide whether these variables should be considered, or whether this type of 
analysis will put judges in an improper position of second guessing existing emironmental 
standards and will make Title VI a surrogate for environmental laws. 
African American Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 8 F. Supp.2d 330 
(S.D.N.V. 1998), may be instructive regarding the limits that courts may place on address-
ing such policy considerations. In that case, a civil rights organization and the parents of 
Hispanic and African-American public school students challenged state legislation that 
required state school funds to be distributed based on student attendance rather than 
enrollment. See id. at 336. The plaintiffs alleged that the attendance-based system of fund 
distribution created a disparate impact on New York City minorities because of factors 
such as single parenting, poor housing, and poor medical programs, which conu'ibuted to 
student absenteeism. See id. at 338. In response, the court stated that "one cannot look to 
Title VI's regulations for remedy for any alleged disparate impact of this nature, however 
real and distressing." Id. The court reasoned that, because it was not the practices of the 
fund recipients (the school districts) that produced these social problems and the absen-
teeism, "Title VI's regulations support no action under law upon those factors." See id. at 
339. Thus, the court appeared to be unwilling to find a disparate impact under Title VI 
where the differences resulted from societal factors that disproportionately impacted on 
minorities, but were not caused by the defendants' program policies. See id. 
419 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
420 See supra text accompany notes 356, 357. 
421 See supra text accompanying note 361. 
422 NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981); Coalition of Con-
cerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984); see supra 
note 356. But see supra note 349. One commentator questions the fairness of even impos-
ing this level of burden upon defendants in a facility siting context. See Bradford C. Mank, 
Environmental Justice and DisC1'iminatory Siting: Risk Based Representation and Equitable Compen-
sation, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 329, 386 (1995) [hereinaftel' Mank, Equitable Compensation]. Ac-
cording to Professor Mank, courts should not adopt tlle 1991 Civil Rights Act's expansion 
of Title VII protections to Title VI without explicit congressional instruction. See id. "Un-
like job discrimination, the siting of a polluting or disposal facility brings both costs and 
benefits to any community." Id. at 332. In fact, "facilities often bring greater tax and em-
ployment benefits than harms." Id. at 386. Professor Mank argues that the plaintiff should 
therefore be required to prove the existence of statistically significant disparity and that 
the harms to tlle affected group exceed the benefits that the facility will provide to that 
group. See id. 
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ness necessity,423 existed for issuing the permit. Thus, the permitting 
agency has an opportunity to ')ustify" a decision that results in an 
otherwise impermissible disparity. In Title VI cases, courts have found 
that disparity can be justified by: (a) the balance of overall benefits 
created by the discriminatory practice;424 (b) a finding that the "chal-
lenged policy was necessary to meeting a goal that was legitimate, im-
portant, and integral to [the fund recipient's] institutional mis-
sion";425 or (c) the absence of a necessary resource in other locales.426 
In the context of Title VII, the Supreme Court has defined a justifying 
business necessity as any practice that significantly serves the legiti-
mate interest of the employer, but which is not necessarily essential or 
indispensable to the employer's interests.427 Recently, district courts 
have concluded that the 1991 Act adapted the business necessity test 
to some extent and requires defendants to prove "that the challenged 
practice is reasonably necessary to achieve an important business ob-
jective. "428 
423 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 161 (citing Georgia State Conference of Branches of 
NAACPv. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985». 
424 See, e.g., Young v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 544, 551-52 (M.D. 
Ala. 1996) (finding that prevention of athletic recruitment from majority white high 
schools justified the adverse impact created by policies that required transfer students to 
forgo one year of athletic involvement); New York Urban League v. New York, 71 F.3d 
1031,1039 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the disparate benefit caused by subsidies provided 
to predominately white commuter rail users was justified by the benefits that the com-
muter rail system produced for the city, such as minimized road congestion, decreased 
pollution, increased subway and bus ridership). 
425 Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp.2d 1234, 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1998), aff'd, 197 F.3d 484 
(11th Cir. 1999). In Sandova~ the district court found no substantial justification for re-
quiring English only driver's license examinations where alleged safety concerns did not 
prevent non-English speaking out of state licensees from driving, did not prevent illiterate 
or deaf English speakers from driving, and international highway symbols were used 
throughout the state. See id. at 1301-02. The court also found that the administrative con-
cerns did not justifY the disparate impact because the department had successfully admin-
istered foreign language exams over the past ten years and had already expended substan-
tial resources in making accommodations for deaf and illiterate English speakers. See id. at 
1303-05. 
426 See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1413-14 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that, even if siting a new school in a majority white neighborhood increased the 
racial imbalance in a formerly segregated school system, the lack of adequate land in the 
African-American majority neighborhood justified the decision). 
427 See Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Although the 1991 Act 
specifically overruled Wards Cove as to the allocation of burdens, it did not explicitly define 
business necessity in a manner that was inconsistent with Wards Cove. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (k) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. 1991). But see infra note 428 and accompanying text. 
428 Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors, 929 F. Supp. 583,593 (D. R.I. 1996); 
see, e.g., EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 607 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(finding that union's policy of continuing family traditions was not necessary to the busi-
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Based on Title VI and Title VII case law and the 1991 Act, the de-
fendant's rebuttal in a Title VI facility permitting case could consist of 
evidence that siting in the minority neighborhood was reasonably 
necessary based on considerations that are non-discriminatory, inte-
gral, and important to the fund recipient's mission.429 A successful 
rebuttal would likely focus on the overriding benefits that will flow 
from the challenged placement430 and the lack of alternate sites.431 In 
making this second argument, a defendant permitting authority could 
emphasize the time and money that has already been expended to-
wards facility construction.432 
Courts, in turn, might elect to assess the benefits that a facility 
could bring to a community, such as increases in tax revenues,433 em-
ness of steamship clerks). The Donnelly court stated that "Section 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) was 
designed to codity the concepts of 'business necessity' and ~ob relatedness' as they existed 
before ... Wards Cove . ... " See Donnelly, 929 F. Supp. at 593. The court inferred that, be-
cause the language of an earlier version of the 1991 Act ("required by necessity") had been 
altered to read "consistent with business necessity," Congress "meant to require something 
less than a showing of indispensability." See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (l) (A) (i)). 
The Donnelly court additionally noted that if the defendant was required to show that the 
practice in question was indispensable, then no alternative less discriminatory practice 
could exist, rendering the next provision of the 1991 Act meaningless. See id.; see also supra 
text accompanying note 363. 
429 See supra text accompanying notes 424-28. 
430 See, e.g., Young v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 544, 551-52 (M.D. 
Ala. 1996); New York Urban League v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1039 (2d Cir. 1995). A 
permitting authority may raise benefits such as increased jobs and tax base for the com-
munity. However, it seems doubtful that a court will accept such a justification because 
these benefits are in no way related to the goals of the issuer of an environmental permit. 
See supra text accompanying note 425. 
431 See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413-14. In a facility siting case, zoning restrictions may be 
especially important in this regard. 
432 See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 V. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. 
Ohio 1984). The court found that the defendants had legitimate non-discriminatory rea-
sons for siting a highway based on project momentum (ten years of planning) and geogra-
phy (six million dollars of property had already been purchased through eminent do-
main). See id. at 113; see also Fisher, supra note 2, at 326. It should be noted that in most 
facility siting cases it will not be the defendant state or municipal agency that has invested 
funds, but a non-party private business interest. Further, if a challenge is brought immedi-
ately after a permit is issued, it is less likely that considerable time and funds already will 
have been invested in the project. See id. at 327. 
433 See Brief of Amiclls Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 
National Black Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and Pennsylvania Chamber of Bus. and In-
dus. at 24, Seif V. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of Living, (U.S. 1998) (No. 97-
1620). The amicus brief specifically references a predominantly Mrican-American com-
munity in Sumter County, Alabama, which hosts the "largest hazardous waste landfill in the 
country." See id. at 25. The brief contends tllat for four decades before the landfill was 
built, the population of Sumter declined by 40% and the remaining residents experienced 
one of the highest levels of poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality in the state. See id. Since 
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ployment, economic prosperity, and the attendant positive health ef-
fects of these economic improvements.434 However, questions remain. 
For courts to consider '1ustification" effectively, would they need to 
have information about the facility's potential risks and a method for 
balancing the alleged harms against its proposed benefits, or does 
justification stand independent of the harm alleged?435 Is there a level 
of harm for which no justification can be made? What criteria will 
courts use in determining when a benefit has outweighed a burden? 
The plaintiffs prima facie case does not appear to require any type of 
evidence related to a risk assessment,436 therefore, courts may have 
difficulty judging what level of '1ustification" is needed. 
4. Less Discriminatory Alternative 
Under Title VI, if the defendant permitting authority is able to 
rebut the plaintiffs prima facie discriminatory impact case by showing 
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for issuing the challenged 
permit, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff.437 The plaintiff 
may then overcome the defendant's rebuttal by showing the proffered 
justification was actually a pretext for racism,438 or by presenting evi-
dence of a less discriminatory alternative to the permitting authority'S 
policy or action that would serve the agency's legitimate interest in an 
efficient and feasible manner.439 One circuit court has found that 
proving a pretext for racism will require a showing that a discrimina-
tory animus motivated the permitting authority's siting decision.44o 
the landfill's opening, however, tax revenues have enhanced infrastructure, educational 
opportunities, and health care delivery systems in the community, dramatically reducing 
illiteracy and infant mortality rates. See id. 
434 See id. 
435 See generally Mank, Equitable Compensation, supra note 422, at 333 (proposing "a risk-
based approach to representing and compensating ... any person affected by a siting deci-
sion"). 
436 See, e.g., U.S. EPA Region 5, Environmental Risk: Your Guide to Analyzing and Reducing 
Risk (Oct. 1991) <http://www.epa.gov/reg500pa/risk.htm>. 
437 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (I) (A) (ii) (Supp. 1991). 
438 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 161 & n.160-61 (citing Georgia State Conference of 
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (II th Cir. 1985)). 
439 SeeAlbermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see Fisher, supra note 
2, at 325; see also Colopy, supra note 66, at 164. The defendant must have been afforded the 
opportunity to adopt the plaintiffs proposals for alternative practices and must have re-
fused to do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (I) (A) (ii); see also Colopy, supra note 66, at 164 
n.177. -
440 See Elston v. Taladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1413 (lIth Cir. 1993) 
(finding that, since there was no evidence that discriminatory animus motivated the school 
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Plaintiffs historically have found evidencing this level of intent to be 
formidable and, thus, plaintiffs may be unable to show pretext in fu-
ture cases.441 
In presenting a less discriminatory alternative to the court, plain-
tiffs may assert feasible alternate project sites that will "eliminate or 
sharply reduce negative impacts" on minority communities.442 How-
ever, if the defendant has already established that selecting the chal-
lenged site was reasonably necessary because of a lack of acceptable 
alternative locations, plaintiffs will have great difficulty winning this 
argument.443 Plaintiffs will increase their likelihood of successfully 
proposing alternate sites by taking action early in the permitting 
authority and permittee's decision making process, so as best to 
influence the parameters of alternatives considered.444 Related to 
proposing alternate locations, plaintiffs might be able to suceed by 
challenging the necessity of the project per se, arguing that the func-
tion of a "necessary" facility can be performed another way, or per-
haps not at all.445 This strategy may be the only option open if the de-
district's decision not to build in a minority neighborhood, the plaintiffs could not show 
that the location decision was pretextual). 
441 See supra text accompanying notes 56-63. 
442 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 328 (citing Plaintiff's Complaint at 31-32, Clean Air Al-
ternative Coalition v. United States Dept. of Transp. (N.D. Cal. 1993) (No. C-93-0721-
VRW». 
443 See generally Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. 
Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
444 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 327-28. A plaintiff's ability to do so, however, may de-
pend on when in the life of the project suit may be brought. See supra notes 129-30 and 
accompanying text. 
445 See id. at 328. Frequently, legal and financial considerations have forced creative al-
ternatives to pollution generation that was once thought necessary. See id. Fisher offers the 
following example: 
[I]n the early 1970s, the oil industry opposed phasing lead out of gasoline, 
arguing that such a measure would cost seven cents a gallon, or $7 billion a 
year. In 1990, with the phase-out 99% complete, actual costs had proven to be 
95% lower than the industry estimate, due to technological innovation. 
Id. Fisher also cites the result of the recent Supreme Court decision of City of Chicago v. 
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328,333 (1994), which classified municipal incinera-
tor ash as hazardous waste under certain EPA criteria. See id. In that case, the City of Chi-
cago argued that there was no feasible alternative to producing lead and arsenic bearing 
ash otlIer than closing all the city's incinerators. See id. However, following the Court's 
ruling tlIat the ash had to be disposed of as hazardous waste with the attendant extra ex-
pense, the city announced that it would keep its facilities open and would separate the 
lead and arsenic bearing items from the waste, creating a non-hazardous ash product. See 
id. 
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fendant has successfully proven that there are no other sites for the 
challenged facility. 
C. Remedies and Appropriate Relief 
Under Title VI, it is clear that plaintiffs who successfully prove 
disparate impact may be granted injunctive and declaratory relief446 
and reasonable attorney's fees.447 However, in the early to mid-1990s, 
commentators disagreed as to whether monetary damages might also 
be available, or whether such damages necessitated a showing of in-
tentional discrimination.448 The weight of recent case law affirms that 
446 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n of NY, 463 U.S. 582, 599-602 (1983); see 
also Colopy, supra note 66, at 165 (stating that declaratory and injunctive relief are avail-
able once disparate impact is proven); Fisher, supra note 2, at 329 (reporting the availabil-
ity of declaratory and injunctive relief upon a successful demonstration of disparate im-
pact); Lazarus, supra note 7, at 836 (cautioning that "[uJntil recently, it seemed fairly well 
settled that in the absence of a showing of discriminatory intent, equitable relief was tlle 
only remedy available to redress a Title VI violation."); Mank, Equitabk Compensation, supra 
note 422, at 384 (instructing that "[uJntil recently, it appeared that Title VI provided only 
equitable relief .... "). 
447 See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) 
(Supp. 1991). Plaintiffs may not bring an action solely to collect fees expended in a sepa-
rate Title VI administrative action. See Colopy, supra note 66, at 166 n.194 (citing Nortll 
Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Council, 479 U.S. 6, 12-16 (1986). Plaintiffs addi-
tionally cannot recover fees for actions brought against the federal government because 
the Awards Act does not expressly waive sovereign immunity. See id. (citing Shannon V. 
United States, 433 F. Supp.249, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1977». Finally, in calculating recoverable 
attorney's fees, the Supreme Court has disallowed the inclusion of experts' fees in a Title 
VI suit. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 324 n.202 (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosps. V. Casey, 499 
U.S. 83, 102 (1991». 
448 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 165 (asserting that Title VI plaintiffs cannot receive 
compensatory relief without a showing of intentional discrimination); Fisher, supra note 2, 
at 329 (observing tllat damages "seem precluded" except where intentional discrimination 
is found). These views seem to match those expressed by the Court in Guardians. See 463 
U.S. at 612 (White & Rehnquist,1J.); id. at 615 (O'Connor,J., concurring); id. at 608-10 
(Powell, J., & Burger, CJ., concurring); see also id. at 607 n.27 (White, J.) (stating the a 
majority of the court "would not allow compensatory relief in the absence of proof of dis-
criminatory intent."); Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 939 F.2d 204, 206-07 (4th Cir. 
1991) (stating that Guardians held that "intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to an 
award of any sort of 'compensatory damages' to a private litigant in a Title VI case."). But 
see Lazarus, supra note 7, at 836 (reasoning that "it would seem fair to assume that a dam-
ages remedy is now generally available for Title VI violations, even absent a showing of 
discriminatory intent."). Franklin u Gwinnett County Public Schools inspired a period of un-
certainly surrounding the availability of monetary damages for nonintentional violations 
of Title VI by stating that, a "clear majority [of Justices in Guardians J expressed the view 
that damages were available under Title VI in an action seeking remedies for an inten-
tional violation, and no Justice challenged the traditional presumption in favor of a federal 
court's power to award appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action." See 503 U.S. 60, 
70 (1992). The broad language regarding "power to award appropriate relief" seems to 
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courts are limiting compensatory damages to intentional violations of 
Title VI.449 
One commentator has suggested that courts' limitations on 
monetary damages in disparate impact cases may ultimately prove ad-
vantageous to environmental justice advocates as the equitable redis-
tribution of environmental burdens is central to such claims and this 
distinction forecloses the possibility of a damage judgment in lieu of 
redistribution.45o Although siting challenges frequently focus on a 
particular permit, because community groups generally seek institu-
tional change, plaintiffs may prefer to craft the relief requested not 
only to e~oin the permit in question, but to address the entire per-
mitting process of the municipal or state authority.451 
have caused confusion as to whether monetary remedies are u"uly limited to intentional 
violation of Title VI. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1276 nAI (M.D. Ala. 
1998). 
449 See, e.g., Smith v. University of Washington Law Scll., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1337 (W.D. 
Wash. 1998); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688,697 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff'd, 157 
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. 1999). The district court in 
Ferguson cited several district court cases for its finding that "post-Franklin cases have uni-
formly held that compensatory damages under Title VI are available, but only for inten-
tional violations of the act." Id. (citing Tafoya v. Bobroff, 865 F. Supp.742, 749 (D.N.M. 
1994); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (D. Kan. 1994); Millerv. Spicer, 
822 F. Supp. 158, 166--68 (D. Del. 1993)). 
Ferguson leaves open the possibility that this limitation on monetary damages may not 
necessarily preclude compensation for dispal"ate impact claims, however, if the plaintiff is 
able to establish that the fund recipient was aware through continuing and knowing viola-
tions that its facility siting policies evinced intentional discrimination. See Ferguson, 931 F. 
Supp. at 697. Ferguson does not reach a conclusion of the issue and does not address the 
level of proof necessary for a court to find that a policy that caused a disparate impact 
amounted to intentional discrimination for the purposes of the act. See id. However, the 
court does caution that when one applies the standard of intentional conduct under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 "the inquiry collapses into a search for evidence of ... deliberate indiffer-
ence." Id. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a case that could support a finding of "inten-
tional" disparate impact, but not discriminatory treatment. Thus, monetary damages ap-
pear unavailable in disparate impact cases under Title VI. 
450 Fisher, supra note 2, at 329. 
451 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Complaint at 35-39, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96--3960) (requesting: (1) declaratory 
judgment against PADEP for violation of Title VI for operation of its waste permit applica-
tion program in manner that causes a discriminatory effect; (2) rescission of the permit 
issued to SRS; (3) injunction against PADEP requiring a revision of its cI"iteria for review-
ing waste permit applications designed to prevent the granting of permits which have a 
discriminatory effect; (4) injunction against PADEP from receiving federal funds from EPA 
until the court approves PADEP's revised permitting criteria; (5) a temporary restraining 
order staying the SRS waste facility permit; (6) additional relief as the court determines to 
be equitable; and (7) plaintiff's court costs including reasonable attorney's fees and ex-
perts' fees). See also Fisher, supra note 2, at 329. 
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However, such a request for barring a facility and for an agency-
wide evaluation of permitting procedure may be met with judicial re-
sistance.452 
[C]ommentators studying existing environmental racism 
litigation have noted that as a practical matter, while the ju-
diciary is willing to find for plaintiffs in cases that involve the 
provision of a social "good," [such as forcing the implemen-
tation of a program to detect and treat lead poisoning in 
children]453 the courts seem reluctant to make decisions re-
garding the placement of a social "bad" like a [locally unde-
sirable land use]. 454 
What remains to be seen is whether courts will be willing to step into 
this "social engineering" role in the face of what will undoubtedly 
amount to great negative pressure from local government and busi-
ness concerns.455 
To meet a court's potential reluctance to order institutional 
change, Title VI plaintiffs should look to Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public SchoolJ456 in which the Supreme Court intimated that courts may 
have some flexibility in fashioning remedies for civil rights plain-
tiffs.457 In Franklin, the Court affirmed the rule that "absent clear di-
rection to the contrary by Congress, federal courts have the power to 
award any appropriate relief'458 for violation of a federal statute. Find-
452 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 331. 
453 See Matthews v. Kizer, No. C-90-3620-EFL (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 20, 1990) (class ac-
tion complaint, parties later changed to Matthews v. Coye). 
454 Fisher, supra note 2, at 331. 
455 See supra note 300; see also supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
456503.U.S.60 (1992). 
457 See Colopy, supra note 66, at 165 & n.188 (discussing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. 
Sch., 503 U.S. 50, 74-75 (1992), as not allowing monetary damages for unintentional viola-
tions of Title IX in that the federal fund recipient does not have notice that it will be liable 
for such damages. The notice issue does not arise where nonintentional discrimination is 
charged.); see also supra note 448. While ruling that compensatory damages are appropri-
ate only for intentional discrimination under Title IX, the Court in Franklin referenced 
two amendments to Title IX (the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1987,42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d-7 (1988) and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988» as 
indicators that Congress did not intend to limit the general rule that "federal courts have 
the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant 
to federal statute." See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-72; see also Colopy, supra note 66, at 165-66. 
"Congress made no effort [in the 1986 Amendment] ... to alter the traditional presump-
tion in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right. We cannot say, there-
fore, that Congress has limited the remedies available to a complaint in a suit brought 
under Title IX." Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73 (alterations in original). 
458 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70. 
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ing no such contrary direction, the Court directed the lower court to 
fashion a remedy that best addressed the plaintiff's i~uries.459 How-
ever, it is questionable whether this language could be construed 
broadly enough to empower courts to mandate the adoption of new 
policies as a part of injunction.46o 
Offering a more conservative view, another commentator sug-
gests plaintiffs meet a court's reluctance to redistribute environmental 
burdens by stressing Title VI's "uncompromising non-discriminatory 
commands. "461 Advocates could reassure the court that it will not be 
passing judgment on where local authorities must site a facility, or 
even whether it must be built at all, but instead will simply be holding 
that the challenged facility cannot be located in the plaintiff's com-
munity.462 However, because the Third Circuit did not address reme-
dies in Chester, no facility siting cases have reached the issue.463 Should 
a private right of action be found under Title VI for disparate impact, 
it remains to be seen how far courts will go in fashioning an appropri-
ate remedy for a prevailing plaintiff's injury. 
CONCLUSION 
President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12,898 appears to envi-
sion a country where minority communities that are overburdened 
with potentially harmful industrial facilities will have a meaningful 
form of review and relief for what amounts to discrimination on the 
basis of race. Five years ago, the President mandated that Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be the tool by which this justice 
would be accomplished. Perhaps the only thing that is clear today 
about discriminatory effect claims for environmental injustice 
brought under Title VI is that they cannot presently achieve this goal. 
459 See id. at 75-76; see alm Colopy, supra note 66, at 166 n.193. 
460 Could an injunction requiring broad institutional restructuring mandate permit-
ting authorities to account for factors that may be prohibitively expensive for individual 
plaintiffs or community groups to investigate such as community health risks and cumula-
tive effects of facility siting? Similarly, could an injunction require increased community 
involvement in the permitting authority'S siting considerations, bringing an effective mi-
nority voice into the discussion regarding the distribution of necessary environmental 
burdens? 
461 Fisher, supra note 2, at 331. 
462 See id. 
463 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935 n.15 
(3d Cir. 1997) (stating that, although it is "well established that private plaintiffs do not 
have the authority to compel a termination of [federal] funding, we make no determina-
tion at the time as to what alternative remedies offer appropriate relief for plaintiffs who 
prevail in actions to enforce agency regulations brought pursuant to section 602"). 
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EPA regulations promulgated under Section 602 of Title VI, 
which were created to address such disparate effects, are not satisfying 
their stated aim of ensuring distributional equality. EPA has had a 
long history of inadequate Title VI enforcement and its administrative 
remedy is currently hampered by the Interim Guidance, which is am-
biguous as written and appears to have no "bite" as applied. Without 
an effective administrative cure, whether affected minority communi-
ties can seek private enforcement of these regulations in federal court 
is of critical importance to frustrated communities. 
However, even if courts recognize an implied private right of ac-
tion to enforce agency regulations under Title VI, they will have to 
develop an effective disparate impact jurisprudence particular to facil-
ity siting before plaintiffs will have a tool for achieving environmental 
justice. Siting LULUs is fraught with complex considerations that 
touch upon economic, racial, health, social, environmental, geo-
graphic, and political realities. Courts will need to determine which of 
these issues they will consider, and how those considerations will be 
balanced. 
While existing Title VI and VII decisions can help outline the pa-
rameters of how courts may decide to weigh these equities in envi-
ronmental justice claims, Congress and the federal courts have had 
thirty-five years to grapple with civil rights issues particular to educa-
tion and employment. Comparatively, discriminatory siting of objec-
tionable facilities is in its infancy as a civil rights issue. How the law 
resolves questions unique to environmental justice-including health 
risks, cumulative impacts, existing community vulnerabilities, poten-
tial economic benefits, and appropriate remedies-will ultimately de-
termine whether disparate impact lawsuits under Title VI will serve as 
an effective tool for working towards environmental justice. 
